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	 From	one	electoral	campaign	to	another,	disillusioned	Moroccan	citizens	can	often	be	heard	criticizing	political	parties	as	‘all	the	same’,	‘all	corrupt’,	or	claiming	that	‘there	are	no	real	political	parties	in	Morocco’	and	that	‘they	only	represent	their	own	interests’.	This	disaffection	seems	to	extend	to	research	on	the	subject	as	well:	with	a	handful	of	exceptions,	political	parties	have	generally	been	perceived	as	a	scientifically	irrelevant	topic. 1 	And	 yet,	 observing	 this	 partisan	 phenomenon	 raises	 an	 enigma,	 as	 since	 its	independence,	 Morocco	 has	 witnessed	 a	 limited,	 but	 nevertheless	 complex	 form	 of	partisan	pluralism	—	a	rare	feat	in	the	region.	If	political	parties	inspire	such	disdain	in	Morocco,	 what	 characterizes	 those	 who	 get	 involved	 in	 them?	 Do	 they	 represent	 a	homogenous	elite	not	in	line	with	the	rest	of	society,	a	segmented	clientele	guided	by	the	quest	for	scarce	resources,	or	a	microcosm	marked	by	the	cleavages	that	exist	in	society	at	large?		 In	 fact,	 three	 main	 competing	 analyses	 of	 political	 party	 membership	 in	 an	authoritarian	 context	 have	 been	 proposed.	 1)	 Some	 scholars	 have	 highlighted	 a	 deep	rupture	 between	 ‘depoliticized’	 citizens	 and	 a	 political	 elite	 that	 shares	 very	 similar	characteristics	(educated,	urban,	at	times	even	sharing	a	regional	birthplace).2	2)	Others	have	viewed	political	party	membership	through	the	prism	of	a	segmental	paradigm.3	3)	Finally,	 some	 scholars	 have	 interpreted	 the	 social	 dividing	 lines	 that	 run	 through	 the	
																																																																				1	Myriam	Catusse,	Karam	Karam	(eds),	Returning	to	Political	Parties?	Political	Party	Development	in	the	Arab	
World,	Beirut,	Lebanese	Center	for	Policy	Studies,	2010.	See	also	Jean-Claude	Santucci,	‘Le	multipartisme	marocain	entre	les	contraintes	d'un	“pluralisme	contrôlé”	et	les	dilemmes	d'un	“pluripartisme	autoritaire”’,	
Revue	des	mondes	musulmans	et	de	la	Méditerranée,	111–112,	2006,	p.	63–117.	2	Juan	Linz,	Alfred	Stepan,	Problems	of	Democratic	Transition	and	Consolidation.	Southern	Europe,	South	
America	 and	 Post-Communist	 Europe,	 Baltimore,	 The	 Johns	 Hopkins	 University	 Press,	 1996;	 Thomas	Carothers,	‘The	End	of	the	Transition	Paradigm’,	Journal	of	Democracy,	13	(1),	2002,	p.	5–21;	Michel	Camau,	Vincent	Geisser,	Le	 syndrome	 autoritaire.	 Politique	 en	Tunisie	 de	Bourguiba	 à	Ben	Ali,	 Paris,	Presses	 de	Sciences	Po,	2003.	3	According	to	the	main	advocate	of	this	approach,	in	the	absence	of	centralization	or	any	particular	political	institution,	the	‘structural	equilibrium’	of	the	tribal	world	can	primarily	be	explained	by	rivalry	between	tribes	and	between	each	of	 their	 segments,	and	by	 the	role	of	 arbitrators	played	by	 the	saints.	 (Ernest	Gellner,	Saints	of	the	Atlas,	Chicago,	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1969).	
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partisan	landscape	from	two	different	angles:	social	cleavages	(centre-periphery,	urban-rural,	workers-owners,	Church-State)4	or	generational	renewal.5		 From	 another	 perspective,	 since	 the	 earliest	 references	 on	 the	 subject	 were	published,6	analyses	of	Moroccan	political	life	have	often	remained	biased,	due	to	the	fact	that	they	reduce	the	institutional	political	game	to	a	confrontation	between	the	Palace	and	the	political	elite;	such	a	framework	leaves	little	room	for	producing	a	sociology	of	political	 party	members.	Working	 from	 different	 insights,	 John	Waterbury	 and	 Rémy	Leveau	have	emphasized	the	monarchy’s	importance	in	structuring	the	political	partisan	landscape	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 independence.	 According	 to	 Waterbury’s	 segmental	approach,	the	political	behaviour	of	the	king	and	the	elites	has	remained	steeped	in	the	traditions	of	the	Makhzen7	and	of	tribalism,	despite	the	social	upheavals	provoked	by	the	Protectorate.	Used	in	a	defensive	manner	to	safeguard	the	‘patrimony’,	power	was	only	preserved	by	dividing	an	already	limited	elite.	The	identity	of	political	actors	remained	‘situational’	above	all,	and	political	parties	had	unstable	clienteles	rather	than	veritable	partisans;	hence	the	precariousness	of	alliances,	which	made	it	difficult	to	find	coherence	between	actions	and	coalitions	and	stated	ideologies.	From	this	point	of	view,	there	is	‘a	constant	jostling	and	rubbing	of	various	political	units,	accompanied	by	an	atmosphere	of	tension	and	crisis,	that	usually	continues	the	maintenance	of	balance,	or,	if	it	is	upset,	tends	towards	its	restoration’.8	According	to	Leveau,	the	monarchy	and	the	Mouvement	
national	 (National	Movement),	 allied	 in	 the	 nationalist	 fight	 against	 the	 Protectorate,	start	competing	with	each	other	after	 independence.	Consequently,	 the	monarchy	saw	political	pluralism	and	electoral	mechanisms	as	instruments	to	control	and	fragment	a	polarized	 political	 landscape:	 it	 encouraged	 splits	 and	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 birth	 of	‘administrative	parties’.9	The	electoral	analysis	conducted	by	Leveau	during	the	1960s	
																																																																				4	Pierre-Robert	Baduel,	 ‘Les	 partis	 politiques	 dans	 la	 gouvernementalisation	 de	 l'État	 des	 pays	 arabes.	Introduction’,	in	‘Les	partis	politiques	dans	les	pays	arabes.	1.	Le	Machrek’,	Revue	des	mondes	musulmans	
et	de	la	Méditerranée,	81–82,	1998,	p.	9-51.	5 	For	 a	 critical	 approach	 to	 the	 generational	 perspective	 on	 Islamism,	 see	 Alain	 Roussillon,	 ‘Les	islamologues	dans	l'impasse’,	in	‘À	la	recherche	du	monde	musulman’,	Esprit,	8–9,	2001,	p.	93–115. 6	Rémy	Leveau,	Le	fellah	marocain	défenseur	du	trône,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	1985	(1st	ed.:	1976);	John	Waterbury,	The	Commander	of	the	Faithful:	The	Moroccan	Political	Elite	–	A	Study	in	Segmented	Politics,	New	York,	Columbia	University	Press,	1970.		7	In	Morocco,	the	‘Makhzen’	represents	the	Royal	House	—	both	the	territory	over	which	it	exerts	its	power	and	its	administrative	extensions.	 8	J.	Waterbury,	The	Commander	of	the	Faithful…,	op.	cit.,	p.	6.	9	Designated	by	this	name	because	of	the	direct	or	indirect	administrative	support	they	received	and	their	close	ties	with	the	Palace.		
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revealed	‘solid	blocks	of	opposing	tendencies’,10	which	reflected	geographical,	social	and	cultural	cleavages	structured	around	a	main	dividing	line	separating	the	urban	and	rural	worlds.	At	 the	time,	 cities	only	accounted	 for	one-fourth	of	 the	population.	The	urban	population	 was	 more	 responsive	 to	 the	 opposition’s	 discourse,	 composed	 of	 two	components	 from	 the	 Mouvement	 national:	 Istiqlal,	 the	 party	 of	 the	 ‘old	 bourgeois	guard’, 11 	which	 was	 nationalist,	 urban,	 drawn	 from	 the	 merchant	 class	 and	 more	traditionally	educated;	 and	 the	Union	nationale	des	 forces	populaires	 (UNFP	 -	National	Union	of	Popular	Forces),	the	party	of	the	middle	class, which	was	younger,	more	modest	in	 means,	 overwhelmingly	 urban	 and	 included	 modern	 intellectuals. 12 	The	 rural	population	was	dominated	by	local	elites,	composed	of	landowners	who	were	sensitive	to	the	status	of	the land	and	who	hoped	to	preserve	their	socio-economic	position.	This	is	the	realm	where	the	Mouvement	populaire	(MP	-	Popular	Movement)	took	root,	acting	as	the	representative	for	rural	and	Amazigh	elites;	the	party	endorsed	strong	monarchical	executive	competences	while	remaining	wary	of	the	Mouvement	national’s	hegemony.	In	order	to	counter	the	opposition,	the	first	administrative	party	was	created	in	1963:	the	
Front	de	 la	défense	des	institutions	constitutionnelles	(FDIC	-	Constitutional	 Institutions	Defence	Front)	brought	together	members	of	the	Rabat,	Salé	and	Marrakech	bourgeoisie,	as	well	as	old	Makhzen	families.		 The	urban	revolts	in	1965,	the	emergence	of	far	left-wing	groups	at	the	end	of	the	1960s	and	the	rise	of	 Islamist	movements	starting	 in	 the	1970s	all	paved	the	way	for	generational	 analyses. 13 	Nevertheless,	 other	 analyses	 still	 endure.	 For	 Leveau, 14 	the	monarchy	 managed	 to	 achieve	 its	 stability	 starting	 in	 the	 mid-1970s	 by	 employing	repression	as	well	as	divide-and-rule	tactics	while	mobilizing	the	nationalist	repertoire	and	launching	the	so-called	democratic	process.	Henceforth,	the	recognition	of	the	king’s	hegemony,	of	Moroccan	ownership	of	the	contested	territory	of	Western	Sahara	and	of	Islam	as	the	exclusive	domain	of	the	Commander	of	the	Faithful	established	boundaries	between	the	 legal	opposition,	represented	by	the	Union	socialiste	des	 forces	populaires	
																																																																				10	Paul	Chambergeat,	‘Les	élections	communales	marocaines	du	29	mai	1960’,	Revue	française	de	science	
politique,	11	(1),	February	1961,	p.	89–117,	here	p.	117.	11	P.	Chambergeat,	ibid.	12	P.	Chambergeat,	ibid. 13 	Mohammed	 El	 Ayadi,	 ‘Les	 mouvements	 de	 la	 jeunesse	 au	 Maroc.	 L'émergence	 d'une	 nouvelle	intelligentsia	politique	durant	les	années	soixante	et	soixante-dix’,	in	Didier	Le	Saout,	Marguerite	Rollinde	(ed.),	Émeutes	 et	mouvements	 sociaux	 au	Maghreb,	 Paris,	 Karthala,	 1999,	 p.	 201–230;	 François	Burgat,	
L'Islamisme	au	Maghreb.	La	voix	du	Sud,	Paris,	Karthala,	1988.	14	R.	Leveau,	Le	fellah	marocain	défenseur	du	trône,	op.	cit.,	postface.	
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(USFP	-	Socialist	Union	of	Popular	Forces),15	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	movements	that	were	doomed	to	illegality	(first	far	left-wing,	then	Islamist	parties).		 The	shift	towards	political	liberalization	that	began	at	the	end	of	the	1990s,	on	the	one	hand,	saw	the	development	of	analyses	highlighting	the	divide	between	the	partisan	elite	and	citizens,	and	which	tended	to	erect	 ‘civil	society’	as	an	alternative	to	political	society.16	Liberalization	was,	on	the	other	hand,	accompanied	by	a	resurgence	of	studies	on	electoral	clientelism.17	It	is	important	to	recall	that	this	liberalization	was	reflected	in	the	 creation	 of	 the	 ‘consensual	 alternation	 government’	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	secretary-general	of	the	USFP	(1998)	and	in	the	integration	of	Islamists	from	the	Parti	de	
la	 justice	 et	 du	 développement	 (PJD	 -	 Party	 for	 Justice	 and	 Development)	 within	 the	parliament.	 This	 marked	 the	 birth	 of	 governmental	 coalitions	 that	 brought	 together	former	 rivals:	 the	 left	 (USFP)	 and	 right	 (Istiqlal)	 wings	 of	 the	Mouvement	 National,	‘national	parties’	born	out	of	the	Mouvement	national	—	Istiqlal,	USFP,	Parti	du	progrès	et	
du	 socialisme	 (PPS	 -	 Party	 for	 Progress	 and	 Socialism)	—	 and	 parties	 that	 had	 been	stigmatized	by	these	same	organizations	for	being	‘administrative’	only	a	few	years	prior.	The	 proliferation	 of	 parties	 continued	 to	 broaden	 the	 horizon	 of	 the	 institutionalized	political	scene.18	Certain	elements	of	Moroccan	political	 language	remained	persistent:	since	its	creation	in	2008,	the	Parti	authenticité	et	modernité	(PAM	-	Party	for	Authenticity	and	Modernity)	was	denounced	by	 its	 rivals	 as	being	a	new	 administrative	party;	 co-founded	by	‘friend	of	the	King’,	a	former	State	Secretary	for	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior,	the	 party	 experienced	 soaring	 electoral	 progression,	 attracting	many	 elected	 officials	from	former	administrative	parties.	In	the	wake	of	the	2011	protest	movements,	a	new	threshold	was	reached.	During	the	2011	legislative	elections,	Islamists	from	the	PJD	—	
																																																																				15	The	party	split	off	from	the	UNFP.	The	various	organizations	and	study	data	are	presented	in	Appendix	1.		16	For	 a	 critical	approach,	 see	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	 ‘Jeux	 de	miroir	 de	 la	 “politisation”	:	 les	acteurs	associatifs	de	quartier	à	Casablanca’,	Critique	internationale,	50,	2011,	p.	55–71.	17	The	term	clientelism	refers	to	vertical,	asymmetrical,	particularist	relations	based	on	the	exchange	of	goods	and	services,	which	may	be	social	and	not	merely	financial.	For	an	overview	of	the	debate	regarding	political	clientelism,	see	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	‘Introduction	:	Représenter	et	mobiliser	dans	l'élection	législative	au	Maroc’,	 in	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	Myriam	Catusse,	 Jean-Claude	Santucci	 (ed.),	Scènes	et	
coulisses	 de	 l'élection	 au	Maroc.	 Les	 législatives	 2002,	 Paris,	 Karthala,	 2004,	 p.	 15–53,	 here	 p.	 39	 ff.	 On	Morocco,	 see	 also	 the	 other	 contributions	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 volume,	 as	well	 as	 Lamia	 Zaki	 (ed.),	
Terrains	 de	 campagne	 au	 Maroc.	 Les	 élections	 législatives	 de	 2007,	 Paris,	 Karthala,	 2009;	 and	 Myriam	Catusse,	Lamia	Zaki,	 ‘Gestion	communale	et	 clientélisme	moral	au	Maroc	 :	 les	politiques	du	Parti	de	 la	justice	et	du	développement’,	Critique	internationale,	42,	2009,	p.	73–91.	18	In	the	same	fashion,	the	number	of	parties	represented	in	the	House	of	Representatives	continuously	grew	(3	in	1963;	6	in	1977;	8	in	1984;	11	in	1993;	15	in	1997;	21	in	2002;	24	in	2007),	before	seeing	a	drop	in	2011	(18).	
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who	until	that	point	represented	the	main	opposition	in	parliament	—	took	the	helm	of	a	government	 that	was	more	mixed	 than	ever	before:	 the	patchwork	coalition	 included	
Istiqlal,	a	nationalist	party,	the	MP,	still	seen	by	some	as	an	administrative	party,	and	the	PPS,	a	former	Communist	party	that	spearheaded	the	fight	to	reform	the	personal	status	code	at	the	beginning	of	the	2000s,	which	the	PJD	strongly	opposed.		 After	fifty	years	of	accelerated	social	transformation,	faced	with	a	rather	murky	institutionalized	political	scene,	marked	by	the	 ‘notabilization	of	parties	of	activists’,19	the	issue	of	clientelism	remains	central	to	most	interpretations.	While	observing	electoral	campaigns,	we	wondered	about	the	future	of	‘the	configuration	defined	by	the	opposition	between	rural	local	elites	who	were	‘defenders	of	the	throne’	and	urban	activists,	heirs	to	the	Mouvement	 national’.20	In	 this	 article,	 our	 starting	 premise	 is	 that,	 ever	 since	 the	former	oppositions	were	transformed	into	governmental	parties,	 the	political	partisan	landscape	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	 two	 phenomena:	 first,	 certain	 parties	 are	 in	competition	to	accumulate	electoral	and	governmental	mandates,	while	others	consider	that	 ‘seats	 don’t	 matter	 much’	 or	 boycott	 elections	 altogether.	 Second,	 localized	clientelistic	mobilization	is	not	the	sole	purview	of	parties	of	local	elites	and	‘notables’.	From	this	starting	perspective,	how	is	the	unclear	boundary	between	‘parties	of	activists’	and	‘parties	of	notables’	reflected	in	the	composition	of	political	party	membership?21		
An	innovative	fieldwork	design22		In	order	to	 identify,	on	the	one	hand,	 the	characteristics	and	dividing	lines	that	structure	the	political	partisan	landscape	in	terms	of	values,	sociography,	socialization	and	recruitment	pools,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	linkages	between	individual,	collective	and	organizational	 trajectories,	we	established	a	database	of	4,127	congress	delegates	
																																																																				19	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	 ‘“Businessmen”	versus	“Professors”:	The	parliamentary	 “notabilisation”	of	a	party	of	militants	 in	Morocco’,	 in	Returning	to	Political	Parties?,	Beirut,	The	Lebanese	Center	 for	Policy	Studies,	2010	[online].	URL	:	http://	ifpo.revues.org/1097.	20	M.	Bennani-Chraïbi,	‘Introduction	:	Représenter	et	mobiliser	dans	l'élection	législative	au	Maroc’,	art.	
cit.,	p.	23	ff.	21	We	treat	these	two	categories	as	ideal	types	that	echo	the	distinction	between	two	repertoires	of	action:	one	parochial,	patronized	and	particular;	the	other	cosmopolitan,	modular	and	autonomous	(Charles	Tilly,	
Contentious	 performances,	 Cambridge,	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 2008).	 In	 activist	 parties,	 partisan	organization	and	altruistic	dedication	often	compensate	for	the	lack	of	proper	social	resources	by	providing	‘collective	partisan	capital’:	a	political	mark,	emblems,	etc.	On	the	other	hand,	notables	rely	on	their	social	and	individual	capital	and	on	mediators	that	they	reward	with	material	goods:	their	actions	are	above	all	‘personal,	disrupted	and	local	[rather	than]	anonymous,	persistent	and	national’	(Michel	Offerlé,	Les	partis	
politiques,	Paris,	PUF,	2002,	p.	20	and	24).	22	In	the	sidebar	on	p.	1186,	see	the	important	contributions	made	to	this	group	project. 
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from	 ten	 Moroccan	 political	 organizations,	 surveyed	 between	 2008	 and	 2012, 23 	in	tandem	with	other	means	of	data	collection	(observation,	life	story	accounts,	repeated	interviews).	The	 selection	 of	 political	 organizations	 was	 determined	 by	 historical	 and	ideological	 criteria,	 dynamics	 of	 crisis,	 fragmentation	 or	 unification,	 while	 ultimately	being	 governed	 by	 the	 vagaries	 of	 national	 congress	 schedules.	 The	 sample	 includes	parties	of	notables	(such	as	the	PAM	and	the	MP),	governmental	parties,	parliamentary	opposition	parties	and	non-parliamentary	opposition	parties	(those	calling	for	a	boycott	of	 the	 elections).	 These	 organizations	 represent	 a	 number	 of	 diverse	 orientations:	nationalist	 (Istiqlal),	 (ex)-governmental	 left-wing	 (USFP,	 PPS),	 radical	 left-wing	 (Parti	
socialiste	 unifié	 -	 PSU	 -	 Unified	 Socialist	 Party;	 Parti	 de	 l’avant-garde	 démocratique	
socialiste	 -	 PADS	 -	 Socialist	 Democratic	 Vanguard	 Party)	 and	 far	 left-wing	 (Annahj	
addimocrati	 -	 Democratic	 Way). 24 	In	 addition,	 we	 included	 an	 anti-globalization	organization	that	promoted	‘a	different	way	of	doing	politics’.	In	fact,	members	of	ATTAC-CADTM	Morocco	tend	to	consider	their	involvement	as	an	alternative	to	political	party	affiliation.	Including	these	individuals	in	our	database	allowed	us	to	examine	closely	the	boundaries	 between	 the	 institutionalized	 political	 scene,	 protest	 arenas	 and	 non-conventional	politics,	while	investigating	the	particularities	of	partisan	membership	from	the	fringes.	National	congresses	constitute	a	fundamental	event	in	the	life	of	a	political	party.25	Delegates	from	all	over	the	country	get	together	in	the	same	place,	for	at	least	forty-eight	hours,	primarily	 in	order	 to	elect	party	 leaders,	 comment	on	 the	ethical	 and	 financial	reports	of	the	out-going	team,	and	more	broadly,	to	discuss	fundamental	political	issues	for	 the	 party.	 The	 classical	 unities	 of	 time,	 place	 and	 action	 embodied	 at	 national	congresses	 thus	 make	 them	 an	 ideal	 opportunity	 for	 conducting	 surveys.	 While	observation	is	itself	worthy	of	interest,	these	events	also	provided	simultaneous	access	to	an	important	number	of	party	members	(between	100	and	more	than	5,000	delegates,	
																																																																				23	The	timing	of	the	study	should	be	taken	into	account	when	analysing	data	that	is	sensitive	to	political	circumstances,	such	as	the	answers	given	to	the	question	regarding	‘allies’	or	‘adversaries’.	24	According	to	a	PSU	leader	(interview,	6	June	2013),	the	radical	left	wing	opted	for	‘the	reformism	of	the	democratic	 Left’	 and	 for	 ‘parliamentary	 monarchy’,	 whereas	 the	 far	 left-wing	 ‘did	 not	 break	 with	 its	traditional	revolutionary	ideas’.		25	According	 to	 organic	 law,	 a	 party	must	 hold	 its	 national	 congress	 every	 four	 years	 at	 least	 (Official	Bulletin	no.	5992	dated	3	November	2011,	<http://www.sgg.gov.ma/historique_bo.aspx?id=982>).	
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depending	 on	 the	 size	 and	 wealth	 of	 the	 party)	 that	 were	 highly	 invested	 in	 the	organization	at	the	time	of	the	congress.26	Establishing	a	sample	was	quite	a	challenge.	Faced	with	uncertainty	regarding	the	parent	population	for	national	congress	delegates,27	and	due	to	the	unusual	nature	of	this	kind	of	study	 in	Morocco,	we	opted	 for	a	reflexive	approach,	 towards	both	the	survey	negotiations	and	the	implementation	of	mechanisms	for	distributing,	administering	and	collecting	 the	 questionnaires.28	Before,	 during	 and	 after	 each	 congress,	 we	 relied	 on	‘allies’	to	maximize	the	data	we	collected	on	congress	delegates’	profiles,	the	main	issues	being	discussed,	internal	struggles,	the	material	dimension	of	the	organization,	etc.	Over	the	 course	 of	 ten	 surveys,	 we	 tried	 to	 adopt	 comparable	 procedures,	 with	 a	 team	composed	primarily	of	students	who	had	been	trained	ahead	of	time,	while	still	adapting	on	 the	 ground	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 organization	 in	 question	 and	 how	 the	 study	was	welcomed	by	congress	organizers.29	Cognizant	of	the	fact	that	such	studies	often	tend	to	discriminate	against	the	less	educated	and	that	Morocco’s	rural	population	has	very	low	rates	of	literacy,30	we	strengthened	the	survey	procedure	in	parties	that	had	a	solid	rural	base	(Istiqlal,	MP,	PAM).	Despite	our	best	efforts,	however,	the	rates	of	return	were	still	very	low	during	these	huge	congresses	(21%	for	the	MP,	14%	for	Istiqlal	and	PAM),	which	is	 itself	 indicative.	 In	 three	 cases,	 we	 were	 able	 to	 slip	 questionnaires	 into	 congress	delegates’	packets	(PJD,	PPS,	PSU).	During	the	ATTAC	congress,	organizers	scheduled	a	break	that	was	long	enough	for	delegates	to	fill	out	the	questionnaire	en	masse.	Of	course,	these	elements	all	had	repercussions	on	the	rates	of	return	(see	Appendix	1).	The	record	obtained	by	the	PJD	(54%)	was	surpassed	by	the	PSU	(68%)	and	then	ATTAC	(98%).		Two	methods	were	employed	to	produce	the	first	set	of	results.	On	the	one	hand,	cross-sorting	allowed	us	to	identify	the	overall	characteristics	of	delegates,	in	particular	by	 comparing	 them	 across	 party	 lines.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 multiple	 correspondence	
																																																																				26	Such	study	conditions	are	favourable	to	the	production	of	snapshots	and	thus	do	not	grant	access	to	ex-members.		27 	After	 the	 congresses,	 we	 obtained	 data	 for	 all	 the	 congress	 delegates	 from	 the	 USFP	 and	 the	 PJD	(distribution	by	sex,	age,	socio-professional	characteristics	and	regional	origin).	28	Delegates	had	the	choice	of	filling	the	questionnaire	out	on	their	own,	or	having	it	administered	to	them.		29	On	the	subject	of	investigating	political	parties,	see	in	particular	the	special	issue	edited	by	Myriam	Aït-Aoudia	 et	 al.,	 ‘Enquêter	 dans	 les	 partis	 politiques.	 Perspectives	 comparées’,	 Revue	 internationale	 de	
politique	comparée,	17	(4),	2010.	30	According	to	the	2004	general	census,	the	rate	of	illiteracy	was	60.5%	in	rural	areas	and	29.4%	in	urban	areas	 (Haut	 Commissariat	 au	 Plan,	 Recensement	 général	 de	 la	 population	 et	 de	 l'habitat	 2004.	
Caractéristiques	démographiques	et	socio-économiques	de	la	population.	Rapport	national,	Rabat,	Direction	de	la	statistique,	2004,	p.	23).	
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analysis	(MCA)	helped	to	detect	 the	underlying	structures	or	structural	 factors,	which	were	otherwise	not	visible	when	analysing	variable	by	variable.	MCA	brings	together	a	number	of	variables,	generally	nominal.	It	visualizes	similarities	and	contrasts.	Its	results	are	 presented	 in	 the	 form	 of	 cloud	 plots	 of	modalities	 and	 individuals,	 with	 the	 axes	representing	the	factors.	These	analyses	produced	typologies	or	categories	that	describe	the	 delegates’	 profiles;	 the	 transformation	 of	 these	 exhaustive	 classifications	 into	automated	synthetic	secondary	variables	in	turn	allows	for	a	second	cross-sorting.	Preliminary	results	seem	to	indicate	that	the	Moroccan	political	landscape,	shown	in	 miniature	 through	 our	 sample	 of	 delegates,	 is	 governed	 by	 selective	 logics.	Nevertheless,	 strong	 dividing	 lines	 differentiate	 parties	 of	 activists	 and	 parties	 of	notables	 on	 the	 sociographic	 level.	 These	 divergences	 are	 partially	 reflected	 in	relationships	to	politics	and	values.	From	an	ideological	and	religious	point	of	view,	the	main	 oppositions	 are	 structured	 within	 the	 same	 socio-professional	 and	 socio-demographic	universe:	the	world	of	the	parties	of	activists.		
Parties	of	Activists,	Parties	of	Notables:	Divergent	Profiles	
	
	 At	first	glance,	the	delegates	seem	to	be	overwhelmingly	urban,	college-educated,	middle-aged31	men32	who	are	middle	managers,	senior	managers	or	executives33	in	the	public	sector.34	These	data	appear	to	corroborate	the	theory	that	political	parties	are	a	world	unto	themselves	and	not	representative	of	the	larger	population,	despite	their	best	efforts	to	reach	out	to	rural	populations,35	women36	and	youth.37	
																																																																				31	In	2008,	79%	of	USFP	delegates	and	61%	of	PJD	delegates	were	40	or	older	(statistical	data	provided	by	both	parties).		32	The	data	to	which	we	had	access	regarding	the	delegates’	parent	population	corroborates	the	low	level	of	female	representation:	10%	for	PADS,	15%	for	ATTAC	and	the	PJD,	29%	for	the	USFP.	33	Only	 the	PJD	determined	 the	proportion	of	middle	managers,	 senior	managers	and	executives	for	 its	member	in	2008	(70%).	In	our	sample,	this	category	was	slightly	over-represented	for	the	PJD	(74%).	34	43	per	cent	of	the	delegates	in	our	panel	were	employed	in	the	public	and	semi-public	sectors	(compared	with	32%	in	the	private	sector).	By	contrast,	among	the	Moroccan	labour	force,	employment	in	the	public	and	 semi-public	 sectors	 reached	 only	 8.7%	 in	 2011	 (Haut	 Commissariat	 au	 Plan,	 Activité,	 emploi	 et	
chômage,	Rabat,	Direction	de	la	statistique,	2012,	<http://www.hcp.ma/Emploi-par-secteur-d-activite-au-niveau-National_a158.html>).	Nevertheless,	a	cohort	analysis	should	show	that	the	reconfigurations	of	the	Moroccan	labour	market	are	reflected	in	the	broad	strokes	of	our	sample	population. 35	Let	us	recall,	however,	that	rural	areas	were	the	preserve	of	the	monarchy	under	Hassan	II.	36	Yasmine	Berriane,	Femmes,	associations	et	politique	à	Casablanca,	Rabat,	Centre	Jacques	Berque,	2013	(chap.	4).	37	According	to	Article	26	of	the	organic	law	on	political	parties,	‘all	political	parties	must	strive	to	integrate	and	generalise	the	participation	of	women	and	young	persons	in	the	political	development	of	the	country’.	 
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	 At	second	glance,	however,	the	partisan	microcosm	appears	to	be	structured	by	a	dividing	line	between	two	different	universes:	on	one	side,	highly	educated	individuals,	civil	servants	[‘gens	du	public’],38	mostly	urban-dwelling,	corresponding	to	radical	 left-wing	and	Islamist	parties	;	on	the	other	side,	those	with	little	or	no	schooling,	working	in	the	private	sector	[‘gens	du	privé’],	closer	to	the	rural	world	and	the	parties	of	notables.	This	ideal	type	opposition	can	be	further	be	refined	by	interpreting	axes	1	and	2	of	the	‘education	and	employment’39	factor	map	on	(Appendix	2)	and	the	classes	that	can	be	deduced	from	them	(Table	2).		
Table	1.	Distribution	of	Delegates	(Survey	Data	from	2008–2012)	and	of	the	Overall	
Population	 (2004	 General	 Census), 40 	Aged	 20	 and	 Older,	 by	 Age, 41 	Sex,	
Urban/Rural	 Residence,	 Education,	 Occupation	 and	 Socio-professional	 Category	
(%	in	columns42)	
	 	 Delegates	2008–2012	 General	Census	2004	20–30	years	old	30–39	40–49	50–59	60	or	over	
13	22	29	22	6	
18	14	11	7	8	Women	Men	 14	83	 51	49	Urban	Rural	 77	17	 58	42	Higher	education	 65	 4	Executives,	managers,	liberal	professionals 56	 9																																																																						38	On	the	polarising	nature	of	employment	sectors,	see	in	particular	François	de	Singly,	Claude	Thélot,	Gens	
du	public,	gens	du	privé.	La	grande	différence,	Paris,	Dunod,	1988;	Florence	Haegel,	Les	droites	en	fusion.	
Transformations	de	l'UMP,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	2012.	39	The	party	to	which	respondents	belonged,	their	education	level,	the	foreign	languages	they	spoke,	their	sector	 of	 employment	 (public	 administration;	 public	 and	 semi-public	 companies;	 private	 sector;	permanent	 staff	 of	 political	 parties,	 associations,	 trade-unions;	 legislative	 body)	 and	 their	 socio-professional	 category	 were	 active	 variables,	 proportional	 in	 size	 to	 their	 contribution	 to	 the	 factorial	design.	The	classes	were	projected	with	sizes	proportional	to	their	weight.		40	To	compare	our	sample	with	data	from	the	general	census,	we	excluded	18	and	19	year	olds	from	our	panel	(1%)	and	those	under	20	from	the	census	data	(Haut	Commissariat	au	Plan,	Recensement	général	de	
la	population	et	de	l'habitat	2004...,	op.	cit.).	41	The	age	of	respondents	was	calculated	according	to	2010	data.	42	In	all	the	simple	sortings	presented	in	this	article,	percentages	are	rounded	up,	and	the	‘no	answer’	and	‘other’	categories	are	not	indicated.	 
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Table	2.	Distribution	of	Delegates	by	‘Education	and	Employment’	Class	(EE)	and	
by	Organization	(%	in	columns)	-	Survey	Data	from	2008–201243	
	 	 Annahj	 ATTAC	 Istiqlal	 MP	 PADS	 PAM	 PJD	 PPS	 PSU	 USFP	 Total	EE1	EE2	EE3	EE4	EE5	EE6	
10	48	3	11	2	26	
8	21	10	13	0	48	
20	30	9	26	6	10	
13	20	17	36	4	10	
13	49	4	12	3	19	
16	22	22	24	3	13	
41	36	7	7	3	6	
27	24	11	23	4	11	
24	48	8	11	0	10	
43	28	5	8	9	7	
26	31	10	18	4	11			 In	the	bottom-right	quadrant,	the	first	factor	opposes	the	‘no	answer’	category44	(EE5-	class	5)	and	the	young	 individuals,	students	or	 those	having	recently	graduated	(EE6	-	class	6),	to	all	the	rest.	The	EE6	class	is	in	proximity	with	ATTAC	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	the	far	left	wing	(Annahj)	and	the	radical	left-wing	(PADS).	From	the	upper-right	to	the	bottom-left	quadrant,	the	second	factor	opposes	two	clusters,	with	education	levels	plotted	along	a	continuum.45			 Around	the	private	sector,	the	first	cluster	is	close	to	the	parties	of	notables	(or	those	in	the	process	of	notabilization)	and	is	composed	of	two	sub-clusters.	Class	4	(EE4)	is	associated	with	very	low	levels	of	education,	blue-collar	workers	and	craftsmen,	small	and	medium-sized	farmers,46	but	also	to	informal	and	precarious	workers:	it	displays	a	close	affinity	to	the	MP	(Istiqlal,	PAM	and	the	PPS	are	also	over-represented	in	this	class).	Class	 3	 (EE3)	 is	 in	 proximity	 with	 entrepreneurs,	 large-scale	 farmers	 and	 family	businesses,	and	is	largely	associated	with	PAM	(but	also	with	the	MP).		 Around	 the	 public	 sector,	 the	 second	 cluster	 is	 close	 to	 the	 left	 wing	 and	 the	Islamists,	 revealing	 two	different	 profiles.	 Class	 1	 (EE1)	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 over-representation	of	individuals	who	completed	over	three	years	of	higher	education,	a	tiny	percentage	of	whom	did	so	abroad,	those	who	speak	foreign	languages,	senior	managers	and	executives,	liberal	professionals	and	college	professors.	This	class	is	closer	to	the	ex-																																																																				43	The	dark	grey	indicates	percentages	that	are	much	higher	than	the	overall	average,	and	the	light	grey	indicates	those	that	are	slightly	higher.		44	The	‘no	answer’	category	should	be	addressed	in	future	publications.		45	The	subtle	contrasts	within	each	cluster	become	sharper	when	plotted	against	axes	2	and	3.	We	have	retained	the	class	descriptions	as	they	bring	together	the	most	significant	associations.	46	In	our	sample,	farmers	represented	9%	(in	2004,	32.1%	of	the	labour	force	was	employed	in	agriculture,	according	to	the	general	census,	p.	36).	According	to	data	on	USFP	delegates’	parent	population	in	2008,	6%	were	 farmers	 (the	 same	 proportion	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 sample	 population).	 This	 category	 is	 not	mentioned	 in	 the	 data	 collected	 by	 the	 PJD	 on	 the	 parent	 population	 of	 its	 delegates	 in	 2008,	 but	 it	accounted	for	2%	of	our	sample.		
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governmental	left	wing,	the	USFP,	and	the	PJD.	Class	2	(EE2)	brings	together	those	who	completed	2	to	3	years	of	higher	education,	middle	managers,	primary	school	teachers,	permanent	 staff	 members	 of	 political	 parties,	 associations	 and	 trade	 unions;	 it	 is	associated	with	the	radical	left-wing	(the	PSU,	PADS)	and	the	far	left	wing	(Annahj).		 The	description	of	socio-demographic	characteristics	in	relation	to	‘education	and	employment’	classes	completes	 this	picture	(Table	3).	The	rural	cluster	(EE4	and,	 to	a	lesser	 extent,	 EE3)	 is	marked	 by	 an	 even	 higher	 predominance	 of	men	 and	 the	 over-representation	 of	 the	 elderly	 (EE4)	 and	 of	 30	 to	 39	 year-olds	 (EE3).	 Its	 profiles	 are	characterized	 by	 stability	with	 regard	 to	 intergenerational	 professional	 trajectories,47	whether	combined	or	not	with	downward	social	mobility.	The	urban	cluster	(EE1,	EE2,	EE6)	also	presents	two	different	socio-demographic	profiles.	At	one	end,	those	under	30,	with	a	higher	percentage	of	women	and	stable	urban	residential	trajectories	(EE6).48	At	the	 other	 end,	 40-	 and	 50-year	 olds	whose	 residential	 trajectories	were	 either	 firmly	urban	(EE1)	or	marked	by	rural	exodus	(EE1,	EE2);	the	professional	trajectories	revealed	mainly	upward	social	mobility	(EE1,	EE2).	Concerning	the	age	groups	that	correlate	with	managers	and	executives,	let	us	underscore	that	40-year	olds	tend	to	be	over-represented	in	the	PJD	(40%),	while	50-year	olds	and	those	over	60	tend	to	be	in	proximity	with	the	USFP	(45%).		 	
																																																																				47 	Intergenerational	 professional	 trajectories	 (IPT)	were	 elaborated	 by	 comparing	 the	 occupation	 and	socio-professional	category	of	the	respondent	and	that	of	his	(or	her)	father.	 In	30%	of	cases,	we	were	unable	to	implement	the	comparison;	this	was	the	case	for	those	who	declined	to	answer	and	young	people	who	were	still	studying.	We	are	cognizant	of	the	fact	that	the	question	of	social	mobility	requires	further	investigation	due	to	its	complex	nature.		48	Residential	 trajectories	 (RT)	were	 elaborated	 by	 comparing	 the	 birthplace	 and	 current	 residence	 of	respondents.		
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Table	3.	Distribution	of	Delegates	by	Sex,	Age,	Urban/Rural	Residence,	Residential	
Trajectory	(RT),	Intergenerational	Professional	Trajectory	(IPT)	and	by	‘Education	
and	Employment’	Class	(EE)	(%	in	columns)	-	Survey	Data	from	2008–2012		
		 EE1	 EE2	 EE3	 EE4	 EE5	 EE6	 Total	Men	Women	 84	14	 85	13	 89	10	 87	11	 60	8	 69	28	 83	14	Under	30	30–39	40–49	50–59	over	60	
5	17	36	27	8	
8	22	34	27	4	
14	31	30	16	4	
13	25	24	19	12	
5	13	18	19	6	
59	20	12	2	1	
14	23	30	21	6	Urban	Rural	 91	6	 82	15	 77	18	 54	41	 39	11	 82	13	 77	17	RT:	stable	urban	RT:	stable	rural	RT:	rural	-->	urban	
61	5	25	
52	13	25	
53	14	19	
36	38	15	
26	9	8	
64	11	14	
52	15	21	IPT:	stable	IPT:	progression	IPT:	regression	
15	65	5	
12	53	14	
33	47	6	
33	24	21	
7	5	2	
2	1	1	
17	43	10		Comparing	 the	 residential	 trajectories	 and	 the	 intergenerational	 professional	trajectories	across	political	organizations	supported	the	trends	discussed	above	(Table	4).	Some	political	parties	are	largely	characterized	by	stable	rural	residency	(especially	the	MP	and	Istiqlal),	and	present	professional	trajectories	that	are	either	marked	by	social	stability	or	a	downward	social	mobility	(in	particular	for	the	parties	of	notables,	the	MP,	PAM	and	Istiqlal).	Other	parties	correlate	with	stable	urban	residency	or	rural	exodus	and	by	upwardly	mobile	professional	 trajectories	(particularly	strong	 for	 the	PJD,	but	also	above	average	for	the	USFP	and	the	PSU),	which	was	characteristic	of	the	first	generations	post-independence	to	have	benefited	from	the	massive	expansion	of	education.	Contrary	to	 certain	 analyses	 that	 have	 been	 proposed, 49 	upward	 social	 mobility	 does	 not	characterize	the	trajectories	of	party	members	as	a	whole.	According	to	our	hypothesis,	upward	social	mobility	 is	more	specifically	 linked	with	parties	of	activists	and,	within	these	parties,	the	40-	and	50-year	olds	who	are	‘settled’,	rather	than	young	individuals	
																																																																				49	Daniel	Boy,	François	Platone,	Henri	Rey,	Françoise	Subileau,	Colette	Ysmal,	C'était	 la	gauche	plurielle,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	2003,	p.	36.	
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more	or	 less	adrift	with	regard	to	social	status.50	The	parties	of	notables,	on	the	other	hand,	 show	 the	 co-existence	 of	 two	 different	 profiles:	 the	 elites	 that	 reproduce	themselves,	and	their	pauperized	‘clients’.		
Table	 4.	 Distribution	 of	 Delegates	 by	 Residential	 Trajectory	 (RT),	
Intergenerational	 Professional	 Trajectory	 (IPT)	 and	 by	 Organization	 (%	 in	
columns)	-	Survey	Data	from	2008–2012		
		 ATTAC	 Annahj	 PADS	 PSU	 USFP	 PJD	 PPS	 Istiqlal	 MP	 PAM	 Total	RT:	stable	urban	RT:	stable	rural	RT:	 rural	 -->	urban	
58	6	25	
50	10	25	
59	6	26	
59	12	21	
56	11	20	
54	8	27	
48	16	24	
52	21	15	
44	32	15	
45	15	16	
52	15	21	
IPT:	stable	IPT:	progression	IPT:	regression	
10	21	11	
6	41	9	
12	43	10	
15	47	11	
16	48	8	
11	56	9	
18	41	10	
21	38	12	
25	37	12	
22	31	13	
17	43	10			 A	 sociographic	 analysis	 of	 the	 Moroccan	 political	 partisan	 landscape	 reveals	several	 elements.	 First	 of	 all,	 although	 this	 microcosm	 is	 constituted	 by	 an	 elite,	 it	nevertheless	still	 reflects	many	of	 the	dynamics	at	play	 in	society	at	 large.	Despite	 the	various	reconfigurations	of	the	Moroccan	political	scene,	the	opposition	between	parties	of	 activists	 and	 parties	 of	 notables	 still	 remains	 structural,	 and	 appears	 to	 encounter	strong	socio-demographic	and	socio-professional	dividing	lines.	In	an	ideal	type	fashion,	the	 parties	 of	 notables	 correlate	 to	 rural	 dwellers,	 the	 private	 sector,	 low	 levels	 of	education,	 and	 stable	 or	 downwardly	 mobile	 socio-professional	 trajectories.	 Activist	parties,	on	the	other	hand,	are	more	closely	associated	with	urban	dwellers,	the	public	sector,	high	levels	of	education,	as	well	as	a	tendency	for	socio-professional	ascension,	stable	 urban	 residency	 or	 a	 rural	 exodus	 trajectory.	 Secondly,	 PJD	 delegates	 are	 not	marginalized,	and,	from	a	sociographic	point	of	view,	the	ex-governmental	left	wing	(the	USFP)	is	much	closer	to	PJD	Islamists51	than	to	the	radical	left	wing	or	the	far	left	wing.	In	fact,	the	highly	educated,	senior	managers	and	executives,	and	those	who	experienced	a	great	deal	of	social	mobility	are	largely	in	proximity	with	the	parties	that	were	part	of	the																																																																					50	Their	profile	is	quite	similar	to	that	of	the	2002	recruits	for	the	LCR	(Ligue	communiste	révolutionnaire	-	Revolutionary	Communist	League)	(Florence	Johsua,	‘De	la	LCR	au	NPA	(1966–2009).	Sociologie	politique	des	 métamorphoses	 de	 l'engagement	 anticapitaliste’,	 doctoral	 dissertation	 in	 political	 science,	 Paris,	Sciences	Po	Paris,	2011).	51	M.	Bennani-Chraïbi,	‘“Businessmen”	versus	“Professors”...	‘,	art.	cit.	
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opposition	 before	 joining	 the	 government,	 with	 a	 13-year	 historical	 gap,	 echoing	 the	association	of	the	USFP	with	50	year-olds	and	those	over	60,	and	that	of	the	PJD	with	40	year-olds.	On	the	other	side,	middle	managers	—	also	well	associated	with	40	and	50	year-olds	—	and	young,	highly	educated	individuals	have	a	close	affinity	with	political	organizations	 that	 are	 on	 the	 fringes	 of	 the	 electoral	 contest.	 As	 for	 ATTAC,	 the	association	that	hoped	to	do	politics	differently,	its	membership	largely	correlate	with	those	currently	pursuing	a	degree	or	having	recently	graduated.	Thirdly,	although	certain	proximities	 appear	 across	 age	 brackets	 and	 political	 affiliation,	 at	 this	 stage	 in	 our	research	we	cannot	prove	that	a	clear	overlap	exists	between	a	political	generation	and	an	ideological	family.		 Exploring	 the	 strategic	 positions	 and	 the	 normative	 universe	 of	 congress	delegates	 reveals	 that	 the	 structural	 oppositions	 that	 exist	 from	 a	 sociographic	perspective	translate	into	different	relationships	to	politics,	without,	however,	explaining	the	differences	expressed	from	the	point	of	view	of	political	and	religious	values.			
National	Politics	vs.	Local	and	Patronized	Politics	
		 The	 main	 dividing	 line	 that	 runs	 through	 the	 Moroccan	 political	 partisan	landscape	as	illustrated	by	the	congress	delegates	stems	from	a	relationship	to	politics:	it	separates	the	world	of	local,	pragmatic	and	clientelist	politics	from	the	world	of	national	politics,	 structured	 by	 ideological	 identities.	 This	 boundary	 does	 not	 only	 distinguish	political	parties	from	each	other:	in	particular,	it	affects	those	parties	whose	image	and	identity	were	reconfigured	when	they	moved	from	being	part	of	opposition	to	being	part	of	 the	government.	We	shall	 examine	 these	 contrasts	 from	 three	 different	 angles:	 the	strategic	 positions	 of	 delegates	 within	 the	 political	 landscape;	 the	 incentives	 and	meanings	attributed	to	their	political	involvement;	and	religious	values.		
‘Allies	and	Adversaries’	Structured	by	Attitudes	Towards	the	Monarchy		 The	‘Left’	and	the	‘Right’	are	strong	concepts	that	have	been	referred	to	so	often	that	it	is	sometimes	difficult	to	remember	that	they	are	in	fact	rooted	in	a	well-defined	semantic	field.	Since	Morocco’s	independence,	the	members	of	the	opposition	that	clearly	
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identify	 as	 being	 on	 the	 ‘Left’ 52 	have	 constantly	 tried	 to	 locate	 their	 ‘right-wing’	adversaries.	Those	on	the	Left	automatically	associate	the	right	wing	with	‘traditionalism’	and	 ‘conservatism’.	 Using	 a	 Marxist,	 somewhat	 Third	 World	 vocabulary,	 they	 lump	together	the	 ‘comprador’	bourgeoisie,	subjugated	by	the	regime	and	 ‘imperialism’	and	‘feudal’	 leaders:	 local	 elites	 supported	 by	 the	monarchy	 to	 control	 and	 stabilize	 rural	regions.	As	soon	as	Islamist	movements	gain	in	prominence,	they	are	likewise	described	as	‘right-wing’,	and	sometimes	even	‘far	right-wing’	by	those	on	the	Left	who	see	them	as	another	one	of	the	monarchy’s	attempts	to	weaken	the	opposition.	It	was	only	at	the	end	of	the	1990s	that	Moroccan	actors	began	to	positively	self-identify	as	being	on	the	Right,	a	 phenomenon	 which	 was	 linked	 with	 the	 political	 rise	 of	 the	 ‘entrepreneur’,	 ‘as	 a	metaphorical	or	archetypal	figure	[...]	using	material	[...]	and	ideological	mechanisms’.53		 Since	1998,	electoral	engineering	and	the	emergence	of	party-list,	proportional	single-round	elections	have	replaced	ballot-box	stuffing,	with	the	result	 that	no	single	party	 can	 obtain	 an	 absolute	 majority.	 We	 suggest	 that	 the	 succession	 of	 several	heterogeneous	governments	has	perhaps	erased	the	boundary	between	‘us’	and	‘them’,	including	 among	 political	 party	 members.	 Consequently,	 how	 are	 we	 to	 establish	indicators,	 according	 to	which	 delegates	may	position	 themselves?	And	 from	 another	point	of	 view,	how	can	 respondents	be	asked	 to	 situate	 themselves	 in	 relation	 to	key	political	actors	who	overshadow	the	institutionalized	political	scene	or,	on	the	contrary,	who	inhabit	its	fringes?	As	we	were	unable	to	have	recourse	to	a	‘routinized’	measure,	like	 the	 Left-Right	 spectrum,	 or	 to	 a	Moroccan	 tradition	 of	 political	 surveys,	we	were	forced	 to	 ‘cobble’	 something	 together.	 In	 particular,	 we	 asked	 a	 semi-open	 question:	‘Currently,	 as	 a	 member	 of	 party	 X,	 what	 are	 the	 organizations	 and	 actors	 that	 you	consider	as	potential	allies	or	adversaries?’54	The	respondents	were	instructed	to	check	several	 boxes	 in	 a	 table	 that	 listed	 three	 categories	 (ally,	 adversary,	 neither	 ally	 nor	adversary	—	‘neither/nor’)	and	16	to	17	variables:	names	of	political	organizations	that	were	either	part	of,	or	excluded	from,	 the	 institutionalized	political	scene,	as	well	as	a	number	of	additional	actors,	like	‘the	King’	or	‘the	King’s	entourage’.																																																																					52	See	the	special	issue	edited	by	Didier	Monciaud,	Ilham	Khuri-Makdisi,	‘Les	gauches	en	Égypte.	19e-20e	siècle’,	Cahiers	d'histoire,	105–106,	2008;	and	Hamit	Bozarslan,	‘De	quoi	la	révolution	est-elle	le	nom	?	Post-scriptum	pour	poursuivre	la	réflexion’,	in	Hamit	Bozarslan,	Gilles	Bataillon,	Christophe	Jaffrelot,	Passions	
révolutionnaires.	Amérique	latine,	Moyen-Orient,	Inde,	Paris,	Éditions	de	l'EHESS,	2011,	p.	169–182.	53	Myriam	Catusse,	Le	temps	des	entrepreneurs	?	Politique	et	transformations	du	capitalisme	au	Maroc,	Paris,	Maisonneuve	&	Larose,	2008,	p.	253.	These	changes	likewise	occurred	within	the	governmental	Left.	On	this	topic,	see	M.	Bennani-Chraïbi,	‘“Businessmen”	versus	“Professors”...	‘,	art.	cit.	54	This	question	was	subject	to	slight	rewordings.	
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	The	King	and	The	Question	on	Allies	and	Adversaries	The	question	concerning	‘allies	and	adversaries’	was	the	only	one	to	have	been	the	topic	of	negotiations	with	representatives	from	certain	political	parties.	The	reactions	that	the	question	provoked	were	quite	 telling.	When	I	asked	the	president	of	 the	committee	 in	charge	of	organizing	 the	2008	USFP	congress	—	 the	 first	organization	 surveyed	—	 to	express	his	reactions	regarding	the	questionnaire,	this	former	exiled	journalist	answered	by	saying:	 ‘Well,	 I’m	not	going	to	act	 like	a	censor!’	Then,	when	I	 talked	to	the	PJD,	 its	political	 bureau	 unanimously	 approved	 the	 survey	 (with	 one	 member	 absent)	 and	proposed	 slipping	 the	 questionnaire	 into	 the	 packets	 given	 to	 the	 delegates,	 on	 one	condition:	‘Take	the	King	out	of	the	survey’.55	PPS	leaders	likewise	welcomed	the	survey,	while	unknowingly	making	the	same	request	as	 the	PJD,	asking	 for	 the	removal	of	 the	variables	 ‘the	 King’	 and	 ‘the	 King’s	 entourage’.	 In	 both	 cases,	 leaders	 explained	 that	constitutionally,	the	King	was	not	a	political	actor	like	everyone	else;	that	he	was	above	all	others	and	therefore	could	not	be	viewed	as	an	‘ally’	or	an	‘adversary’.	Moreover,	once	the	 questionnaires	 were	 inserted	 into	 delegates’	 packets,	 they	 became	 congress	documents	and	 the	party	was	 thus	 ‘responsible’	 for	 them.	With	 regard	 to	 the	MP,	 the	organizers	of	the	congress	were	not	involved	with	distributing	the	questionnaires,	but	they	likewise	asked	for	‘the	King’	to	disappear	from	the	document.	This	problem	did	not	occur	with	any	of	the	radical	left-wing	or	far	left-wing	parties,	even	when	these	were	in	charge	of	distributing	the	questionnaires	and	of	having	their	members	fill	them	out.	This	is	not	truly	surprising,	as	these	parties	were	surveyed	for	the	most	part	between	2011	and	2012,	when	the	taboo	of	the	King	was	being	challenged.	Contrary	to	my	expectations,	those	with	whom	I	spoke	from	Istiqlal	and	PAM	did	not	express	any	particular	reticence	with	regard	to	the	subject.	For	Istiqlal,	I	only	managed	to	secure	authorization	and	access	to	the	congress	space	at	the	very	last	minute,	so	I	did	not	have	time	to	discuss	the	content	of	the	questionnaire.	With	regard	to	PAM,	its	extraordinary	congress	in	2012	hoped	to	give	the	party	a	new	image,	as	it	had	been	widely	decried	by	activists	in	the	20	February	Movement.56 	In	 addition,	 the	 party	 leaders	 wanted	 to	 seem	more	 open,	 as	 they	 had	previously	refused	the	survey	in	2009.																																																																					55	The	PJD	likewise	insisted	on	rewording	the	question	by	speaking	of	‘mutual	help’	rather	than	alliances.		56	On	this	subject,	see	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	Mohamed	Jeghllaly,	‘The	protest	dynamics	of	Casablanca's	February	20th	Movement’,	Revue	française	de	science	politique	(English)	62(5),	October–December	2012,	p.	103–130.	
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	A	 number	 of	 reactions	 from	 Istiqlal	and	 PAM	 delegates	were	 noteworthy.	During	 the	nationalist	party’s	congress,	some	respondents	complained	that	the	questionnaire	was	‘insolent’.	 The	 reaction	of	 some	PAM	members	 reflected	 the	 2011-2012	 context:	 ‘You	want	to	prove	what	we’re	being	accused	of,	you	want	to	show,	with	data	to	back	it	up,	that	we	are	favourable	to	the	King	and	King’s	friends.’	Four	years	earlier,	a	delegate	from	the	USFP	had	declared	when	submitting	his	questionnaire	in	the	‘ballot	box’:	‘I’m	putting	in	a	blank	ballot	out	of	protest!	The	name	of	Himma57	should	not	be	on	this	questionnaire.’	Listening	to	the	‘noise’	and	‘anecdotal	information’	that	 ‘conventional	political	analysis	tends	 to	 dismiss’ 58 	is	 not	 without	 merit,	 including	 when	 attempting	 to	 establish	 a	database.	Sometimes,	the	notes	scribbled	in	a	field	notebook	end	up	providing	valuable	insight	later	when	interpreting	statistical	data.	
		 When	we	examine	the	factorial	map	of	‘allies	and	adversaries’59	(Appendices	3	and	4)	and	 the	 classes	derived	 from	 it,	 ideal	 type	 contrasts	 can	be	 found	on	 two	different	levels.			 From	right	to	left,	the	map’s	first	two	axes	clearly	contrast	the	‘no	answer’	category	(class	6	 -	AA6)	with	the	rest	of	 the	positive	modalities	that	designate	actors	as	 ‘allies’,	‘adversaries’,	 or	 ‘neither	allies	nor	adversaries’.	 From	one	end	of	 the	 spectrum	 to	 the	other,	we	can	see	a	continuum	between	the	MP	on	one	end,	and	the	PSU	(radical	 left-wing)	 and	 ATTAC	 on	 the	 other	 end	 (Appendix	 3).	 Starting	 from	 this	 premise,	 a	 first	hypothesis	 suggests	 itself:	 the	main	 dividing	 line	 that	 runs	 through	 the	 population	of	Moroccan	national	political	party	delegates	stems	from	their	relationship	to	politics.	It	differentiates	those	who	identify	their	allies	and	adversaries	by	looking	at	the	national	political	 landscape	 from	 those	 who	 have	 difficulty	 positioning	 themselves	 in	 this	landscape,	 or	 refuse	 to	 do	 so.	 According	 to	 our	 second	 hypothesis,	 combining	 this	factorial	 map	 with	 the	 one	 that	 synthesizes	 data	 regarding	 education,	 social	 status,	sectors	of	employment	and	socio-professional	categories	allows	us	to	differentiate	two																																																																					57	This	 is	the	name	for	a	 ‘friend	of	the	King’	that	baffled	PAM	members.	When	surveying	the	congresses	covered	 in	 the	summer	of	2008,	 the	questionnaire	 included	 the	category	 ‘Movement	 for	all	Democrats	(Himma)’;	this	was	the	association	from	which	PAM	was	born.		58	Javier	Auyero,	 Lauren	 Joseph,	 ‘Introduction:	 Politics	Under	 the	Ethnographic	Microscope’,	 in	 Lauren	Joseph,	 Matthew	 Mahler,	 Javier	 Auyero	 (eds),	 New	 Perspectives	 in	 Political	 Ethnography,	 New	 York,	Springer,	2007,	p.	1–13,	here	p.	3	and	5.	59	Strategic	positions	are	active	variables,	whose	size	is	proportional	to	their	contribution	to	the	factorial	map.	Parties	and	classes	are	projected	with	a	size	proportional	to	their	weight.		
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clusters:	the	world	of	local	politics,	pragmatic	and	clientelist,	associated	with	the	parties	of	notables,	the	private	sector,	low	levels	of	education	and	rural	residency;	and	the	world	of	national	politics,	structured	by	left-wing	and	Islamist	ideological	identities,	according	to	 ‘political	 sophistication’	 logic,	 associated	 with	 public	 sector	 executives,	 highly	educated	 young	 people	 and	 urban	 dwellers.	 This	would	 corroborate	 the	 oppositions	observed	 in	 Moroccan	 electoral	 history	 between,	 on	 one	 end,	 local,	 particular	 and	patronized	electoral	campaigns,	and	which	rely	on	individual	social	capital,	and	on	the	other	end,	nationally-structured	and	modular	electoral	campaigns	that	rely	on	collective	partisan	capital.60		
Table	5.	Distribution	of	Delegates	By	‘Ally-Adversary’	Class	(AA)	and	by	Political	
Organization	(%	in	columns)	-	Survey	Data	from	2008–2012		
		 Annahj	 ATTAC	 Istiqlal	 MP	 PADS	 PAM	 PJD	 PPS	 PSU	 USFP	 Total	AA1	Polarization:	radical	left,	far	left	AA2	Relative	polarization:	
Mouvement	
National	AA3	Two	responses	or	more	AA4	‘Neither	ally	nor	adversary’	AA5	Polarization	against	the	Left	AA6	No	answer	
68		0				1		9		0		23	
77		0				0		10		0		13	
0		1				0		36		26		37	
1		0				1		 25		29		44		
71		1				0		5		0		23	
4		2				0		27		29		38		
0		0				1		10		56		33	
1		62				0		10		0		26	
82		1				1		4		0		12	
31		25				0		16		3		25	
19		12				1		18		21		30	
		 It	is	only	along	the	second	and	third	axes	that	we	can	see	an	ideological	continuum	develop	between	two	directly	opposed	poles	(Appendix	4,	Table	5);	attitudes	towards	the	King	and	his	entourage	are	at	the	core	of	the	various	ally/adversary	configurations.	To	the	left	end	of	the	graph,	the	radical	left-wing	and	the	far	left-wing	are	associated	with	configurations	 that	 designate	 the	 King	 and	 his	 entourage,	 the	 parties	 of	 notables,	
																																																																				60	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	‘Mobilisations	électorales	à	Derb	Soltan	et	à	Hay	Hassani	(Casablanca)’,	in	M.	Bennani-Chraïbi,	M.	Catusse,	J.-C.	Santucci	(ed.),	Scènes	et	coulisses	de	l'élection	au	Maroc...,	op.	cit.,	p.	105–162,	here	p.	123	ff.	
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organizations	 like	 the	 PJD,	 Al	 Adl	 Wadl	 Ihsane 61 	and	 Salafist	 organizations 62 	as	adversaries,	while	recognizing	left-wing	parties	as	allies	(class	1	-	AA1).	To	the	right,	in	a	sort	of	inverse	reflection,	the	cluster	associated	with	the	PJD,	the	MP,	PAM	and	Istiqlal	identifies	the	left-wing	and	far	left-wing	as	adversaries,	while	the	King	and	his	entourage,	the	parties	of	notables	and/or	other	Islamist	organizations	are	deemed	allies	(class	5	-	AA5).	The	class	of	‘neither	ally	nor	adversary’	is	also	in	proximity	with	Istiqlal,	the	MP	and	PAM	 (class	 4	 -	 AA4).	 Between	 the	 two,	 the	 cluster	 close	 to	 the	 PPS	 (AA2)	 reveals	 an	alliance	that	brings	together	the	radical	left-wing,	the	governmental	left	wing	and	Istiqlal:	in	other	words,	all	the	parties	stemming	from	the	Mouvement	national.	Here,	adversaries	are	much	 less	easily	 identified,	 and	 the	answer	 ‘neither	ally	nor	adversary’	was	often	selected.	Finally,	along	the	second	and	third	axes,	the	‘no	answer’	category	is	repositioned	in	 the	 centre,	 thus	 suggesting	 that	 it	would	 be	 fruitful	 to	 examine	 the	 distribution	 of	delegates	 by	 strategic	 positions,	 education	 levels	 and	 socio-professional	 trajectories	(Table	6).		
Table	 6.	 Distribution	 of	 Delegates	 by	 ‘Ally-Adversary’	 (AA)	 and	 ‘Education-
Employment’	(EE)	(%	in	columns)	-	Survey	Data	from	2008–2012				 EE1	 EE2	 EE3	 EE4	 EE5	 EE6	 Total	AA1:	Polarization:	radical	left,	far	left	AA2	Relative	polarization:	
Mouvement	national	AA5	Polarization	against	the	left	
17		19			25	
26		10			22	
12		13			23	
11		9			17	
10		9			7	
25		11			16	
19		12			21	
Polarization	sub-
total	
61	 58	 48	 37	 26	 52	 52	
AA3	Two	answers	or	more	AA4	‘Neither	ally	nor	adversary’	AA6	No	answer	
1		14		25	
1		15		27	
1		24		28	
0		27		36	
1		8		65	
0		16		31	
1		18		30																																																																					61	One	of	the	main	Moroccan	Islamist	organizations,	born	during	the	1970s.	It	is	characterised	by	its	non-recognition	of	the	King	as	the	Commander	of	the	Faithful	and	by	the	importance	it	attaches	to	spiritual	education.		62	Groups	 that	aspire	 to	 follow	 the	 purity	 of	 the	earliest	Muslims,	and	who	were	 subject	 to	 large-scale	repression	after	the	May	2003	Casablanca	bombings.			
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		 Once	aggregated,	the	polarized	and	‘ideologized’	classes	do	in	fact	correlate	with	urban,	 educated,	 public	 sector,	 senior	 managers	 and	 executives	 (EE1),	 and	 middle	managers	(EE2),	across	all	organizations.	On	the	contrary,	however,	the	‘no	answer’	class	(AA6)	 corresponds	 to	 the	 ‘no	answer’	 ‘education-employment’	 class	 (EE5),	blue-collar	workers	and	craftsmen,	small	and	medium-sized	farmers,	precarious	employment	(EE4),	and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 young	 educated	 individuals	 (EE6).	 This	 category	 is	 also	 often	associated	with	the	parties	of	notables,	the	MP,	PAM	and	Istiqlal	(Table	5).	In	such	cases,	the	 ‘no	 answer’	 category	 indicates	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 distance	 with	 regard	 to	 the	ideological	clues	of	national	politics.63	Nonetheless,	the	slight	over-representation	of	the	PJD	 in	 class	 AA6	 points	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ‘no	 answer’	 response	 can	 also	 be	 sign	 of	prudent	or	disdainful	sophistication	(see	the	text	box	below).	With	regard	to	respondents	from	the	Islamist	party,	this	answer	seems	to	indicate	an	attitude	observed	during	our	previous	surveys:	 adhering	 to	party	discipline	 that	 involves	 complying	with	decisions	taken	collectively	(and/or	hierarchically),	and	asserting	the	goodwill	and	openness	of	a	new	player	on	the	institutionalized	political	scene	who	seeks	to	reassure	other	actors.		 The	‘neither/nor’	class	(AA4)	also	tends	to	express	a	certain	distance	with	regard	to	the	signposts	of	national	politics.	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	associated	with	the	parties	of	notables,	Istiqlal,	PAM	and	the	MP	(Table	5),	and	on	the	other,	with	the	‘education	and	employment’	classes	that	correlate	to	the	private	sector,	low	levels	of	education	and	low	socio-professional	positions	 (EE4),	or,	on	the	 flipside,	 the	world	of	 entrepreneurs	and	large-scale	 farmers	 (EE3).	 This	description	 is	 corroborated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 class	AA4	moreover	concentrates	answers	identifying	well-known	actors	as	allies,	such	as	the	King	and	the	PJD.	‘No	answer’,	‘Neither	ally	nor	adversary’,	‘Two	answers	or	more’64	While	the	questionnaires	were	being	administered,	some	delegates	started	by	listening	to	the	name	of	all	the	actors	and	organizations	in	the	questionnaire	and	then	immediately	indicated	 their	 selections.	 Others	 hesitated,	 or	 asked	 questions	 regarding	 the	 symbol	associated	 with	 each	 party	 to	 the	 person	 administering	 the	 questionnaire	 or																																																																					63	The	‘no	answer’	category	has	been	the	topic	of	debate	in	the	relevant	literature.	One	classic	study	is	Guy	Michelat,	Michel	Simon,	‘Les	“sans	réponses”	aux	questions	politiques	:	rôles	imposés	et	compensation	des	handicaps’,	L'Année	sociologique,	32,	1982,	p.	81–114.	64	The	micro-class	AA3	(0.51%)	represents	 those	cases	where	 the	same	variable	 received	 two	or	more	answers.	 This	 class	 is	 relatively	 trans-partisan,	 can	 be	 found	 in	 different	 ‘education	 and	 employment’	classes,	and	seems	to	indicate	hesitation	or	ambivalence.		
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accompanying	 them.	When	 a	 respondent	 clearly	 indicated	 that	 s/he	 did	 not	 know	 a	political	organization,	s/he	 could	 choose	 to	either	mark	 the	box	as	 ‘neither/nor’	or	 to	leave	it	blank.	During	the	Istiqlal	congress,	I	observed	that	some	individuals	preferred	to	disguise	their	ignorance	by	selecting	‘neither/nor’,	while	others	engaged	in	all	sorts	of	mental	gymnastics	to	try	and	reconcile	the	alliances	that	their	party	had	at	the	national	level	with	the	local	electoral	arrangements	elaborated	during	each	political	race.	The	 ‘two	 responses	 or	more’	 category	 reflects	 different	 relationships	 to	 politics.	 One	young	 shop	 owner,	 introduced	 to	 the	 PPS	 by	 a	 maternal	 cousin,	 expressed	 clear-cut	opinions	 against	 the	 repression	 of	 unemployed	 graduates	 and	 journalists,	 and	 more	broadly	against	 attacks	on	political	 and	civil	 liberties	made	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	 fight	against	 terrorism.	 To	 the	 question	 concerning	 the	 meaning	 that	 he	 gave	 to	 his	 PPS	membership,	 he	 responded:	 ‘None	 at	 all,	 nothing	 changes.’	 Then	 he	 proceeded	 to	 the	question	on	‘allies	and	adversaries’	and	carefully	drew	a	checkmark	through	every	single	box;	he	thus	belongs	to	class	AA3.	A	40-something	university	professor	from	the	same	party	 also	 belongs	 to	 this	 class;	 this	 son	 of	 a	 smallholder	 farmer	 explained	 his	involvement	with	the	party	 in	relation	to	his	desire	to	defend	the	 lower	classes.	After	crossing	things	out	and	making	numerous	corrections,	he	finally	developed	four	positions	(instead	 of	 the	 three	 proposed):	 one	 answer	 for	 allies	 (parties	 stemming	 from	 the	
Mouvement	 national)	 or	 adversaries	 (Islamists	 that	 were	 excluded	 from	 the	 political	stage,	in	particular);	two	answers	for	intermediary	alliance	positions	(far	right	wing)	or	intermediary	adversary	positions	(administrative	parties	and	the	PJD),	combined	with	the	‘neither/nor’	answer.	The	sophistication	of	certain	respondents	even	showed	up	in	the	use	of	the	‘no	answer’	category.	During	the	USFP	congress	in	2008,	a	sixty	year-old	lawyer	worked	through	his	positions	out	loud.	He	identified	some	parties	as	‘unquestionably’	adversaries	(Islamists	and	the	administrative	parties),	and	then	differentiated	the	‘real’	allies	on	the	Left,	which	were	not	part	of	the	2007–2011	governmental	coalition,	from	the	latter’s	circumstantial	allies	 (‘neither/nor’).	 He	 refused	 to	 even	 dignify	 the	 small	 parties	with	 a	 checkmark:	‘They’re	not	worth	including	in	the	final	result.’	
	
	 These	 results	 illustrate	 the	 different	 forms	 of	 politicization	 at	 play	 in	 an	authoritarian	context.	More	significantly,	they	also	show	that	it	would	be	rather	hasty	to	oppose	 ‘politicized’	 professionals	 and	 ‘depoliticized’	 ordinary	 citizens,	 as	 different	
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relationships	to	politics	co-exist	within	the	partisan	microcosm,	and	even	at	times	within	a	single	political	party.	In	fact,	lack	of	interest	in	partisan	and	national	politics	was	even	expressed	 by	 some	 congress	 delegates	 of	 the	 parties	 surveyed.	 Ultimately,	 the	 main	dividing	line	between	Moroccan	national	political	party	delegates	is	not	ideological,	but	reflects	a	 relationship	 to	politics:	on	one	 side,	pragmatic,	 localized	politics,	 embedded	within	a	clientelist	network	that	stretched	beyond	the	rural	community,	and	on	the	other,	national	 politics,	 structured	 by	 political	 identities,	 and	which	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 left	untouched	by	recent	political	reconfigurations.	Ideological	polarization	only	appears	at	a	second	 level,	 within	 the	 world	 of	 40-	 and	 50-year	 old	 urban	 dwellers,	 educated,	executives	 working	 in	 the	 public	 sector,	 as	 well	 as	 some	 young,	 highly	 educated	individuals.	It	is	structured	around	a	position	towards	the	monarchy,	which	presents	a	paradox.	Access	to	the	institutionalized	political	scene	can	only	be	granted	once	a	political	organization	rejects	the	possibility	of	directly	confronting	the	King;	and	yet,	pockets	of	resistance	 against	 the	 monarchy	 still	 exist,	 even	 within	 parties	 whose	 leaders	 have	repeatedly	 demonstrated	 their	 reconciliation	 with	 the	 monarchy. 65 	Exploring	 the	incentives	and	meanings	behind	the	commitments	expressed	by	delegates	will	help	us	to	nuance	these	findings.		
Conceptions	 of	 Partisan	 Membership:	 Between	 Pragmatism	 and	 Ethical	
Declarations	
	 In	order	to	identify	the	social	and	political	values	of	delegates,	we	included	two	open-ended	questions	on	the	questionnaire:	‘What	led	you	to	become	a	member	of	party	or	organization	x?’	(at	the	beginning	of	the	questionnaire);	and	‘Today,	what	does	it	mean	to	you	to	be	a	member	of	party	or	organization	x?’	(in	the	middle	of	the	questionnaire).	As	 we	 rejected	 a	 restrictive	 view	 of	 politicization, 66 	centred	 on	 the	 relationship	 to	institutionalized	 politics	 and	 ‘political	 sophistication’	 logic,	 we	 chose	 to	 word	 the	questions	(in	Arabic)	in	such	a	way	as	to	encourage	both	an	‘increase	in	generalization’	and	 the	 recounting	 of	 specific,	 biographical	 narratives	 to	 explain	 enrolment																																																																					65	In	our	sample,	in	2008,	one	out	of	every	five	USFP	respondents	expressed	a	position	that	was	adversarial	to	the	King.	The	current	political	climate	(in	2011–2012)	only	exacerbated	the	anti-monarchist	trend	that	was	already	visible	when	processing	data	from	the	first	part	of	the	survey	(six	congresses	between	2008	and	2010).		66	For	an	overview	of	the	debate	on	this	topic,	see:	Michel	Offerlé,	 ‘Capacités	politiques	et	politisations	:	faire	voter	et	voter,	19e-20e	siècles’,	Genèses,	67,	2007,	p.	131–149,	and	68,	2007,	p.	145–160;	Myriam	Aït-Aoudia,	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	 Jean-Gabriel	 Contamin,	 ‘Indicateurs	 et	 vecteurs	 de	 la	 politisation	 des	individus	:	les	vertus	heuristiques	du	croisement	des	regards’,	Critique	internationale,	50,	2011,	p.	9–20.	
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circumstances.67	The	 highly	 fine	 encoding	 of	 the	 responses68	highlights	 differences	 in	how	members	joined	a	political	party,	what	belonging	to	a	political	organization	means	to	them,	the	view	they	have	of	their	organization,	frames	of	reference,	values	and	goals,	action	targets	and	scales,	perceptions	of	 their	relationship	to	citizens	and	the	material	and	 non-material	 rewards	 of	 their	 involvement	 (Table	 7).	 Simple	 sorting	 and	 auto-generated	 classifications	 presented	 three	 ideal	 type	 clusters:	 local,	 pragmatic	 and	clientelist	 politics;	 national	 politics	 structured	 according	 to	 political	 identities	(nationalist,	Islamist,	left-wing);	‘a	different	way	of	doing	politics’	(ATTAC).	However,	we	should	note	that	some	parties	stretch	across	first	two	clusters	(Istiqlal,	the	PPS).			 The	pragmatic	and	clientelist	cluster	is	characterized	by	very	few	references	made	to	political	values	and	identities,	with	respondents	instead	emphasizing	individual	and	biographical	 elements:	 family	affiliations,	 local	 interpersonal	 relationships,	 a	desire	 to	‘assert	oneself’,	‘to	gain	experience’,	to	‘realize	political	ambitions’	and	to	participate	in	elections.	 A	 party’s	 renown	 did	 not	 leave	 respondents	 indifferent,	 either,	 whether	 its	image	 was	 of	 being	 ‘large	 and	 established’	 (the	 MP)	 or	 ‘young	 and	 dynamic’	 (PAM).	Moreover,	 during	 the	 interviews,	 certain	 rural	 elected	 officials	 stated	 their	 clear	preference	for	governmental	parties,	which	were	likely	to	bring	their	region	closer	to	the	capital.	When	values	and	goals	were	expressed,	they	often	involved	defending	the	rural	and	Amazighity	(the	MP),	even	the	‘foundations	of	the	regime:	God,	Country,	King’	(the	MP,	Istiqlal).	On	the	local	scale,	respondents	described	themselves	as	mediators	between	political	authorities	and	the	local	population.	While	some	expressed	pride	at	belonging	to	a	 party,	 others	 articulated	 specific	 expectations:	 they	 hoped	 for	 money	 and	 more	importantly,	 a	 job;	 or	 to	 solve	 a	 particular	 problem;	 to	 access	 funding	 for	 their	association;	 to	 operate	 under	 a	 ‘political	 umbrella’;	 to	 gain	 protection	 against	 local	authorities	and	contacts	in	high	places,	etc.		As	he	was	invited	to	fill	out	a	questionnaire,	one	delegate	from	PAM	spoke	to	me	directly:	‘You’re	 conducting	 a	 survey	 on	 political	 parties!	 Do	 you	 really	 believe	 that	 there	 are	political	parties	in	Morocco?!’	Later,	this	local	elected	official,	a	notary	in	his	40s	from	a	small	provincial	town,	told	me	about	his	‘leftist’	past	as	a	student	in	Marrakech,	followed																																																																					67	Camille	Hamidi,	‘Éléments	pour	une	approche	interactionniste	de	la	politisation.	Engagement	associatif	et	rapport	au	politique	dans	des	associations	locales	issues	de	l'immigration’,	Revue	française	de	science	
politique,	56	(1),	February	2006,	p.	5–25.	68	Almost	90	codes	were	produced.	
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by	 his	 involvement	 in	 local	 sporting	 associations.	 Feeling	 ‘unfairly’	 cornered	 by	 the	president	of	his	municipality,	he	defied	the	latter	and	ran	in	the	electoral	race	to	try	to	block	his	path.	According	to	the	respondent,	it	was	thanks	to	his	reputation	as	a	good	and	generous	man	 that	he	managed	 to	 collect	votes.	 In	his	mind,	 a	party	 ‘is	 just	 a	 label	 to	present	oneself	during	elections	and	to	build	alliances’.	As	a	result,	he	changes	 ‘labels’	without	 any	 scruples,	 depending	 on	 the	 opportunities	 presented	 to	 him	 at	 any	 given	moment.	With	humour	and	pride,	he	told	the	story	of	how,	when	he	informed	his	wife	that	he	was	going	to	the	 ‘tractor’	congress	(the	tractor	being	the	symbol	of	PAM),	she	remarked	that	 if	he	kept	changing	 ‘labels’,	he	would	confuse	 ‘the	neighbourhood	kids’	(‘wlad	ad-derb’).	Supposedly	he	responded	by	saying:	‘My	supporters	vote	for	me	and	not	for	a	party	[...].	These	parties	don’t	give	me	anything,	I’m	the	one	bringing	in	votes	for	them.	[...]	Yesterday,	I	was	with	the	dove,	today	I’m	with	the	tractor	and	tomorrow,	why	not,	with	the	apple	or	even	the	banana.’69	
																																																																				69	In	order	to	help	illiterate	voters	identify	the	different	parties,	electoral	lists	use	symbols.	The	dove	is	the	symbol	 of	 the	 Rassemblement	 national	 des	 indépendants	 (National	 Rally	 of	 Independents),	 a	 former	administrative	party.	The	apple	and	the	banana	are	the	fruits	of	our	respondent’s	imagination.		
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Table	 7.	 Ideal	 Type	 Presentation	 of	 Incentives	 and	 Meanings	 Attributed	 to	 Political	 Engagement	 Expressed	 by	
Respondents	-	Survey	Data	from	2008–2012		 	 Local,	pragmatic,	clientelist	politics	<---		--->	National	politics,	structured	on	political	identities	 A	different	way	of	doing	politics		 Nationalist	 Islamist	 Left	wing	 	Organizations	in	close	proximity	with	 MP	 PAM	 Istiqlal	 PJD	 Far	left	wing,	radical	left	wing	 ATTAC	Enrolment	circumstances	 Family	affiliations,	Local	interpersonal	relationships	 Local	interpersonal	relationships	 Family	affiliations,	Local	interpersonal	relationships	 ----	 Exposure	to	politicizing	contexts	and	events	 Exposure	to	politicizing	contexts	and	events	Being	and	doing	 Running	for	office,	realizing	political	ambitions	 Running	for	office,	gaining	experience,	realizing	political	ambitions	
Being	an	active	citizen,	patriotic,	running	for	office,	realizing	political	ambitions	
Being	an	active,	virtuous,	exemplary	citizen,	achieving	the	party’s	goals	
Being	a	committed,	exemplary	activist,	true	to	oneself,	achieving	the	party’s	goals	
Being	a	committed,	exemplary	activist,	gaining	experience,	achieving	the	organization’s	goals	Characteristics	and	view	of	party	 Major	historical	party	 Young	and	dynamic	party	 Major	historical	party,	moderate,	dynamic	
Virtuous,	credible,	moderate	and	dynamic	party,	high	quality	members	and	leaders,	internal	democracy	
Activist,	committed	party	(sacrifices)	 Activist,	committed	organization	
Frame	of	reference	 ---	 ---	(Modernist)	 ---	 Islamic	 Left	wing,	modernist,	progressive	 Anti-globalization	Values	and	goals	 Defending	rural,	Amazighity,	foundations	of	the	regime	
(Raising	moral	standards	in	politics)	 Defending	the	nation,	identity,	the	foundations	of	the	regime	
Raising	moral	standards	in	politics,	defending	identity,	
For	equality,	freedom,	social	justice,	democracy	
For	equality	and	social	justice	
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change,	development	Anti-corruption	
Against	injustice,	tyranny,	corruption	 Against	the	evils	of	globalization,	injustice	and	tyranny	Action	targets	and	scales	 Region,	local	area	All	social	classes	 Region,	local	area	All	social	classes	 Country	All	social	classes	 Country	---	 	Popular	classes	 Transnational	Popular	classes	Relationship	to	citizens	 Mediation	 Mediation	 Mediation	 ---	 Representation	 Representation	Rewards	 Individual	and	non-material	 Individual	and	non-material	 Individual	and	non-material	 Non-material	 Non-material	 Non-material	
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	 The	 two	 clusters	 of	 ‘national	 politics’	 (Islamist,	 left-wing	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	nationalist	 parties)	 and	 ‘a	 different	 way	 of	 doing	 politics’	 (ATTAC)	 tend	 to	 favour	 the	expression	of	altruistic	values,	a	political	identity	and	objectives	based	on	generalizations	that	 transcend	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 biographical.	 In	 fact,	 the	 ‘frame	 of	 reference’	 or	‘ideological	 orientations’	 indicated	 were	 consistently	 Islamic	 for	 the	 PJD,	 modernist,	progressive	 and	 ‘left-wing’	 for	 Annahj,	 PADS,	 the	 PPS,	 the	 PSU,	 and	 the	 USFP	 (varying	between	Marxist-Leninist,	Socialist	and	Social	Democratic	leanings),	and	anti-globalization	for	ATTAC.	The	championed	values	and	causes	were	likewise	referred	to	over	and	over	again.	Although	the	fight	against	corruption	was	an	objective	shared	by	both	the	left-wing	and	the	Islamist	party,	 the	PJD’s	vision	was	reformist,	aiming	to	raise	moral	standards	 in	politics,	while	for	the	Left	(and	ATTAC),	this	was	part	of	a	greater	fight	against	tyranny	and	injustice	and	 for	 democracy,	 equality,	 freedom	 and	 social	 justice.	 The	 left-wing	 parties	 sought	 to	‘represent’	citizens,	while	ATTAC	emphasized	‘raising	awareness’.	The	desire	to	serve	one’s	country	or	the	common	good	was	a	relatively	trans-partisan	one,	as	only	ATTAC	favoured	a	scale	of	action	that	went	beyond	national	borders;	much	like	the	left-wing	parties,	however,	ATTAC	also	claimed	to	defend	the	‘popular	classes’.	With	regard	to	party	membership,	being	a	member	meant	setting	an	example:	being	a	‘patriot’	for	nationalist	parties,	 ‘a	committed	activist’	for	the	Left	and	ATTAC,	and,	for	the	Islamist	parties,	 ‘having	a	strong	moral	code’	and	possibly	even	 ‘sacrificing	oneself’	by	putting	the	party’s	objectives	 first.	The	rewards	gained	were	first	and	foremost	intangible	and	non-material.	Some	individuals	expressed	a	strong	attachment	to	their	party,	like	one	USFP	member	who	associated	the	party	with	‘the	blood	that	ran	in	his	veins’.	Although	certain	descriptions	of	the	party	individuals	belonged	to	were	 relatively	 close	 to	 those	associated	with	 the	pragmatic	 and	clientelist	 end	of	 the	spectrum	—	‘a	major	historical	party’	(Istiqlal,	USFP),	‘dynamic	and	moderate’	(Istiqlal,	PJD)	—	other	 attributes	were	more	 specific:	 the	 party	was	 described	 as	 ‘virtuous’	 (PJD,	 PPS),	‘credible’,	possessing	internal	democracy,	with	highly	qualified	members	and	leaders	(PJD),	or	committed	(the	Left,	ATTAC),	with	a	many	‘sacrifices’	in	its	past	(USFP,	PADS,	Annahj,	PPS).	Finally,	 when	 delegates	 explained	 why	 they	 joined	 their	 party,	 they	 often	 referred	 to	 a	particular	 political	 context	 or	 their	 exposure	 to	 certain	 political	 organizations	 while	 at	university,	in	their	professional	lives	or	in	associations	or	trade	unions.	
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	 Alongside	 the	 positions	 taken	within	 configurations	 of	 allies	 and	 adversaries,	 the	incentives	and	meanings	attributed	to	membership	in	a	given	party	reveal	the	ideological	polarization	of	 those	delegates	 in	close	proximity	with	national	politics.	This	polarization	appears	to	be	underpinned	by	differing	relationships	to	religion	and	religious	values.		
The	Religious	Foundations	of	Ideological	Polarization		 According	to	prevalent	analyses	of	political	sociology,	religious	values	polarise	the	political	partisan	landscape.70	With	regard	to	research	conducted	in	Morocco,	scholars	have	emphasized	 the	 tension	 between	 multi-faceted	 attachment	 to	 religious	 values	 and	 the	process	 of	 individualization. 71 	We	 have	 formulated	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 process	 of	individualization	shapes	—	in	different	ways	—	the	relationship	to	the	sacred	of	both	those	individuals	who	advocate	for	the	‘privatization’	of	religion	and	those	who,	on	the	contrary,	wish	 to	 see	 society	 regulated	 by	 religious	 norms.	 Much	 like	 ideological	 cleavages,	polarization	regarding	religious	matters	largely	plays	out	on	the	urban	stage,	the	main	actors	being	 the	 most	 educated	 members	 of	 society:	 middle	 managers,	 senior	 managers	 and	executives,	students	and	recent	graduates.			 This	study	does	not	seek	to	reconstitute	the	full	spectrum	of	religious	dynamics;	we	therefore	limited	ourselves	to	a	few	questions	on	the	basis	of	in-depth	studies	that	had	been	conducted	previously.	After	investigating	the	links	between	normative	variables	(religious	practices,	whether	the	veil	was	worn	by	the	female	respondent	or	by	the	(male)	respondent’s	wife,	 opinions	on	veil	wearing,	opinions	on	homosexuality72),	 creating	a	 composite	 index	allowed	us	to	measure	levels	of	adherence	to	‘conventional’	religious	values73	or	autonomy	
																																																																				70	See	in	particular	Guy	Michelat,	Michel	Simon,	Classe,	religion	et	comportement	politique,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	1977.	71	See	 these	 two	major	studies:	Rahma	Bourqia,	Mohamed	El	Ayadi,	Mokhtar	El	Harras,	Hassan	Rachik,	Les	
jeunes	et	les	valeurs	religieuses,	Casablanca,	EDDIF,	2000;	Mohamed	El	Ayadi,	Hassan	Rachik,	Mohamed	Tozy,	
L'islam	 au	 quotidien.	 Enquête	 sur	 les	 valeurs	 et	 les	 pratiques	 religieuses	 au	 Maroc,	 Casablanca,	 Éditions	Prologues,	2007.	72	We	offered	respondents	two	choices	(homosexuality	seen	as	a	‘private	matter’	or	as	a	‘practice	contrary	to	morality	and	against	the	law’)	by	basing	ourselves	on	the	fierce	debates	provoked	by	the	‘Ksar	El	Kebir	scandal’.	The	PJD	used	this	occasion	to	position	itself	as	defending	‘the	country’s	moral	values’.		73	Let	us	add	that	we	are	aware	that	religious	values	are	first	and	foremost	part	of	a	pragmatic	approach	to	‘conventional’	reference	points	(on	this	topic,	see	Jean-Noël	Ferrié,	La	religion	de	la	vie	quotidienne.	Rites,	règles	
et	routine	chez	les	Marocains	musulmans,	Paris,	Karthala,	2004)	and	whose	‘established’	or	‘conventional’	nature	evolves	over	time	and	depending	on	location.			
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with	regard	to	said	values.	We	are	cognizant	of	the	fact	that	some	of	the	answers	given	reflect	above	 all	 the	 image	 that	 respondents	 wished	 to	 give	 of	 their	 organization.	 Moreover,	additional	 exchanges	 demonstrated	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 questions	 could	 be	 subject	 to	different	interpretations	and	self-presentations.	Even	the	meaning	to	attribute	to	the	word	‘hijab’74	prompted	questions:	 ‘Can	the	traditional	headscarf	be	considered	a	hijab?’,	 ‘What	about	full-face	veils?’.	There	are	therefore	many	angles	that	should	be	considered	in	future	studies.	Nevertheless,	such	issues	did	not	completely	invalidate	our	results.		
Some	Reactions	to	the	Question	Regarding	Homosexuality	
	
This	question	did	not	provoke	any	specific	remarks	in	the	left-wing	parties	or	the	PJD.	
However,	during	the	Istiqlal	and	MP	congresses,	respondents	expressed	reticence	and	
shock,	 even	 going	 so	 far	 as	 to	 question	 the	 ‘academic’	 nature	of	 the	 study	 and	 the	
‘morality’	 of	 the	 professor	 leading	 it.	 One	 anecdote	 was	 particularly	 revealing:	 an	
elected	official	for	the	MP,	in	his	forties	and	from	a	rural	background,	dressed	in	a	suit	
and	tie	(unlike	many	MP	delegates,	who	preferred	to	wear	clothing	that	reflected	their	
rural	background),	 first	appeared	 to	be	quite	honoured	 that	a	Moroccan	professor	
from	a	foreign	university	was	administering	the	questionnaire	directly.	As	soon	as	the	
question	regarding	homosexuality	came	up,	however,	he	got	up	abruptly	and	put	an	
end	to	the	exchange.	The	symbolic	violence	provoked	by	this	question	was	doubtless	
linked	to	the	effect	of	surprise,	and	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	a	female	professor	was	
asking	a	man	for	his	opinion	regarding	a	—	taboo	—	sexual	practice.	
		 Among	 our	 sample	 population,	 respondents	 predominantly	 adhered	 to	 religious	values	 (65%).	Nevertheless,	 the	 normative	 positions	 that	 distanced	 themselves	 from	 the	‘conventional’	model	—	either	a	high	level	of	autonomy	(17%	of	the	sample)	or	a	high	level	of	adherence	(22%)	—	were	generally	espoused	by	men,	urban	dwellers,	the	highly	educated	and	executives	(‘education	and	employment’	classes	EE1	and	EE2),	rather	than	women,	rural	dwellers	and	those	in	the	private	sector	(EE4,	EE3).																																																																					74	For	 a	 critical	approach	 to	 the	 reification	 of	 the	 veil,	 see	Fariba	Adelkhah,	 ‘Islamophobie	et	malaise	 dans	l'anthropologie.	Être	ou	ne	pas	être	voilée	en	Iran’,	Politix,	4	(80),	2007,	p.	179–196.	
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Table	 8.	 Distribution	 of	 Delegates	 by	 Sex,	 Urban/Rural	 Residence,	 ‘Education-
Employment’	Class	and	According	to	an	Index	of	Adherence	to	Religious	Values	(%	in	
columns)	-	Survey	Data	from	2008–2012	
		 High	autonomy	 Relative	autonomy	 ‘Conventional’	adherence	 High	adherence	 Total	Men	Women	 87	12	 86	11	 80	17	 87	13	 83	14	Urban	Rural	 85	9	 81	14	 74	23	 81	17	 77	17	EE1	EE2	EE3	EE4	EE5	EE6	
30	35	8	9	3	15	
26	31	12	15	3	13	
21	27	11	25	3	12	
33	39	9	13	1	5	
26	31	10	18	4	11			 At	 the	 party	 level,	 a	 continuum	 stretches	 between	 one	 end	 characterized	 by	 high	levels	of	autonomy	with	regard	to	religious	values,	centred	around	ATTAC	and	far	left-wing	parties	(Annahj),	and	another	end	marked	by	a	high	level	of	adherence	to	those	same	values,	centred	around	PJD	Islamists.	The	high	score	of	‘conventional’	adherence	is	attained	by	the	MP,	the	party	of	notables,	closely	linked	with	the	rural	world	(Table	9).		
Table	9.	Distribution	of	Delegates	According	 to	an	 Index	of	Adherence	 to	Religious	
Values	and	by	Organization	(%	in	columns)	-	Survey	Data	from	2008–2012			 ATTAC	 Annahj	 PADS	 PSU	 USFP	 PPS	 PAM	 MP	 Istiqlal	 PJD	 Total	High	level	of	autonomy	Relative	autonomy	‘Conventional’	adherence	High	level	of	adherence	
76		13		10		1	
76		17		5	
52		23		25		1	
50		26		19		5	
27		24		43		4	
17		20		54		8	
7		17		58		15	
2		8		70		17	
2		11		58		24	
		1		26		72	
17		15		43		22	
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	 It	remains	to	be	seen	which	avenues	should	be	taken	to	interpret	this	polarization	on	the	normative	level	between	the	far	left	wing	and	the	radical	left-wing,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	PJD	Islamists	on	the	other.	In	the	case	of	Morocco,	a	generational	reading	underscores	the	particularity	of	the	bilingual	elites	educated	under	the	Protectorate,	and	then	in	the	wake	of	 independence,	 before	 access	 to	 education	was	 expanded.75	Other	 interpretations	 have	pointed	out	that	the	policy	of	Arabization,	implemented	at	the	end	of	the	1970s,	and	which	produced	the	first	‘Arabized’	graduates	in	June	1990,76	in	conjunction	with	the	replacement	of	philosophy	classes	with	 Islamic	studies	starting	 in	1981,	aimed	to	overthrow	left-wing	values.77		 However,	 it	 would	 be	 premature	 to	 establish	 a	 relationship	 of	 cause	 and	 effect	between	the	specific	type	of	education	received	(elitist	and	bilingual	vs.	mass	and	Arabized),	individual	 perspectives	 on	 religion,	 and	 ideological	 adherence.	 The	 distribution	 of	 the	religious	adherence	index	by	age	highlights	the	fact	that	age	brackets	are	linked	with	specific	organizations,	rather	than	displaying	a	generational	relationship	to	religion	(Table	10).		 Taken	as	a	whole,	 the	 ‘products’	of	Arabization	policies	—	in	this	case,	 individuals	under	40	years	old	—	tend	to	position	themselves	in	close	affinity	to	the	‘conventional’	order	(relative	autonomy	and	conventional	adherence),	much	like	those	aged	60	and	over.	With	regard	to	high	levels	of	adherence,	these	are	over-represented	among	40	year-olds	(linked	with	the	PJD)	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	50	year-olds.	Finally,	high	levels	of	autonomy	are	equally	associated	with	50	year-olds	 (closer	 to	 the	USFP)	and	 those	under	30	 (in	proximity	with	ATTAC).			
																																																																				75	For	 instance,	 the	 number	 of	 baccalaureates	 awarded	 (the	 diploma	marking	 the	 end	 of	 high	 school	 and	granting	access	to	higher	education)	was	multiplied	by	48	in	between	1955	(164)	and	1972	(7,899),	and	again	by	5	from	1972	and	1986	(41,182).	Data	from	the	Annuaires	statistiques	du	Maroc	cited	by	Mekki	Zouaoui,	‘L'enseignement	 supérieur	 depuis	 l'indépendance.	 La	 dégradation	 de	 la	 qualité	 était-elle	 inéluctable	?’	 –	Thematic	 issue:	 ‘Système	éducatif’,	Rapport	 ‘50	ans	de	développement	humain	au	Maroc	et	perspectives	pour	
2025’,	2005,	p.	159–195:	<http://www.albacharia.ma/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/31446/1231L%27enseignement%20secondaire%20d%C3%	A9gradation.pdf?sequence=1>.	76	Gilbert	Grandguillaume,	‘L'arabisation	au	Maghreb’,	Revue	d'aménagement	linguistique,	107,	2004,	p.	15–40,	here	p.	26.	77	Driss	Bennani,	‘Azzeddine	Laraki.	L'arabisation	c'est	lui’,	Tel	Quel,	410,	6–12	February	2010,	p.	26–27,	here	p.	27:	<http://www.telquel-online.com/archives/410/actu_maroc1_410.shtml>.	
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Table	10.	Distribution	of	Delegates	by	Age	and	According	to	an	Index	of	Adherence	to	
Religious	Values	(%	in	columns)	-	Survey	Data	from	2008–2012		 	 High	autonomy	 Relative	autonomy	 ‘Conventional’	adherence	 High	adherence	 Total	Under	30	30–39	 20	17	 15	27	 17	23	 4	22	 14	23	
Under	40	 37	 42	 40	 26	 37	40–49	50–59	60	and	older	
26	27	6	
26	20	7	
27	20	7	
40	24	5	
30	21	6			 *		*																					*			 Ultimately,	how	should	the	Moroccan	political	partisan	landscape	be	described?	As	a	selective	club	cut	off	from	the	rest	of	society,	an	elite	chasing	after	scarce	resources,	or	as	a	microcosm	marked	by	the	major	social	cleavages	that	run	throughout	the	society	as	a	whole?	The	 Moroccan	 political	 partisan	 landscape,	 illustrated	 in	 miniature	 by	 our	 sample	 of	delegates	from	ten	different	political	organizations,	is	indeed	a	small	world	dominated	by	urban	dwellers,	largely	well-educated,	middle-aged	men	with	economic	resources.	Far	from	being	cut	off	from	ordinary	citizens,	however,	this	world	is	subject	to	the	same	dynamics	at	play	in	society	at	large.	Although	it	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	segmented	clientele,	it	nonetheless	remains	shaped	by	an	ideal	type	opposition	between	the	parties	of	notables	and	the	parties	of	activists.		 In	fact,	the	most	significant	dividing	line	within	our	panel	is	not	ideological,	but	stems	from	a	relationship	to	politics:	on	one	side,	pragmatic,	localized	politics,	embedded	within	close,	clientelist	networks;	and	on	the	other,	national,	at	times	even	transnational	politics,	built	upon	political	identities	that	have	survived	the	many	reconfigurations	of	the	Moroccan	political	partisan	landscape.	This	opposition	is	laid	atop	important	sociographic	differences:	at	 one	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 private	 sector	 employees	 with	 interdependent	 profiles	 —	
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entrepreneurs	 and	 large-scale	 farmers	 versus	 the	 poorest	 and	 least	 educated,	 associated	with	 rural	 environments;	 and	 at	 the	 other,	 middle	 managers,	 senior	 managers	 and	executives,	 highly	 educated,	 largely	 employed	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 and	 having	 often	experienced	 upward	 social	 mobility,	 as	 well	 as	 young	 university	 students	 and	 recent	graduates.			 As	 for	 ideological	 polarization,	 that	 phenomenon	 tends	 to	 be	 limited	 to	 the	most	educated	individuals.	It	differentiates	Islamists	in	the	PJD	from	members	in	radical	and	far	left-wing	parties	and	is	underpinned	by	the	struggle	to	define	the	role	of	religion	in	politics	and	by	different	attitudes	towards	the	monarchy.	Although	access	to	the	 institutionalized	political	scene	is	officially	dependent	on	recognizing	the	‘foundations	of	the	nation’	—	God,	Country,	 King	 	—	 these	 results	 illustrate	 that	 the	 Moroccan	 political	 partisan	 landscape	contains	a	number	of	more	or	less	latent	zones	of	dissidence.	At	the	very	heart	of	the	former	oppositions	that	ultimately	reconciled	themselves,	hastily	and	with	much	fanfare,	with	the	monarchy,	 adherence	 to	 the	Moroccan	monarchical	 ‘model’	 is	neither	 fully	embraced	nor	irreversible:	 this	 manifests	 itself	 through	 individual	 resistance,	 internal	 crises	 and	 even	sometimes	 in	connection	with	the	protest	arena,	as	seen	 in	2011	 in	the	context	of	 the	20	February	Movement.		 Narrowing	our	focus	to	the	cluster	structured	by	ideological	identities	lets	us	observe	contrasts	 that	 are	 correlated	with	 different	 strategies	with	 regard	 to	 the	 electoral	 scene,	while	 confirming	 that	 Islamism	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 refuge	 of	marginalized	 individuals.	Senior	managers	and	executives	having	experienced	upward	social	mobility	are	associated	with	 the	ex-governmental	 left	wing	 (the	USFP)	and	 the	PJD,	 two	parties	 that,	 at	different	times,	embodied	parliamentary	opposition,	before	their	gaining	access	to	the	government	was	hailed	as	a	historical	 turning	point.	Middle	managers,	university	students	and	recent	graduates	are	more	in	proximity	with	organizations	on	the	fringes	of	electoral	competition,	like	the	radical	and	far	left-wing	parties.	As	for	the	‘different	way	of	doing	politics’	led	by	ATTAC,	 this	 tends	 to	 attract	 highly	 educated	 young	 people.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 generational	interpretation	is	far	from	providing	conclusive	answers	at	this	stage	in	the	research.		 It	remains	to	be	stressed	that	the	political	party	members	polled	are	not	‘all	the	same’:	their	sociographic	diversity,	as	well	as	their	differences	with	regard	to	values,	relationship	to	politics	and	strategic	orientations	represent	some	of	the	most	illuminating	discoveries	of	
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this	study.	Behind	the	burgeoning	of	new	parties	and	numerous	political	reconfigurations,	certain	 elements	 remain	 persistent:	 the	 ‘notabilization’	 of	 former	 oppositions	 does	 not	prevent	some	members	from	clinging	to	their	past	as	rebels,	nor	does	it	stop	new	activist	parties	 from	 emerging.	 And	 it	 is	within	 the	 very	 core	 of	 organizations	 that	 are	 the	most	involved	in	participatory	strategies	that	the	shifting	borders	between	parties	of	notables	and	parties	of	activists	become	blurred.	This	worrying	possibility	was	broached	as	early	as	2008,	when	PJD	delegates	asked	us:	‘Do	you	think	we’ll	end	up	like	the	USFP?’		 Beyond	 this	 first	 overview,	 analysing	 the	 data	 by	 cohorts,	 different	 forms	 of	socialization,	recruitment	pools	and	activist	careers	could	shed	further	light	on	the	processes	behind	the	bifurcations	observed	on	the	normative	and	ideological	levels,	while	also	allowing	for	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	reconfigurations	of	Moroccan	political	party	membership.78		
__________	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi________________________________________________________________	
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Appendix	1.		
		 Organizations	 Officially	est.	 Legis.	Elected	2007/2011	 Declared	number	of	members	-	at	congress	date	
Congress	 Study	Congress	Delegates	present	 Returning	 %	returning	 Distribution*	
Historical	
parties	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Istiqlal	party	
Nationalist.	Governmental	
party	until	2013.	
1944	 52/60			 300,000			 15th	congress	9	to	11	January	2009	Rabat	
5,140	 745	 14	 N	
	 Mouvement	populaire	(MP)	
Links	with	the	resistance.	
Rural	and	Amazigh	roots	
(fusion	process	after	
splits).	Governmental	
party.	
	1959	 	39/32	 	?	 	11th	congress	11	to	12	June	2010	Rabat	
1,685	 355	 21	 N	
Governmental	
Left	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	Union	socialiste	des	forces	populaires	(USFP)	
Born	from	a	split	from	the	
Mouvement	national,	
embodied	the	
parliamentary	left-wing	
opposition	until	1997.	In	
the	context	of	the	Koutla	
(bloc	composed	with	the	
heirs	to	the	Mouvement	national),	it	became	a	
governmental	party	
between	1998	and	2011.	
Its	history	is	littered	with	
splits.	
	
	1975	(1959)	 	38/39	 	60,000				
	8th	congress,	2nd	phase,	13	to	15	June	2008	Bouznika			7	to	9	November	2008	Rabat	
1,356	 451	 33	 N	
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Parti	du	progrès	et	du	socialisme	(PPS)	
Heir	to	the	Moroccan	
Communist	Party	(1943).	
Becomes	a	governmental	
party	in	the	context	of	the	
Koutla	in	1998.	Stays	in	
the	government	after	
2011.	
1974	 17/18	 40,000	 8th	congress	28	to	30	May	2010	Bouznika	
1,845	 612	 33	 0	
Islamist	party	 Parti	justice	et	développement	(PJD)	
After	a	long	process	of	
unification	and	
legalization,	it	represents	
the	main	opposition	
power	in	parliament	until	
2011.	
Main	winner	of	the	‘Arab	
Spring’,	at	the	head	of	the	
government	since	2011.	
1998	 46/107	 16,000	 6th	congress	19	to	20	July	2008	Rabat	
1,370	 741	 54	 0	
The	‘King’s’	
parliamentary	
opposition	
Parti	authenticité	et	modernité	(PAM)	
Created	by	a	‘friend	of	the	
King’,	this	party	was	
quickly	seen	as	a	new	
‘administrative’	party.	
During	the	20	February	
Movement,	it	was	at	the	
centre	of	the	debate	and	
was	one	of	the	protesters’	
main	targets.	(After	our	
survey	was	refused	during	
the	2009	congress,	we	
obtained	the	
authorization	to	survey	
during	an	extraordinary	
congress	in	2012).	
2008	 N/47	 ?	 2nd	extraordinary	congress:		17	to	19	February	2012	Bouznika	
3,057	 429	 14	 N	
Non-
governmental	
Parti	socialiste	unifié	(PSU)	 2005	 6/boycott	 4,000	 3rd	congress	16	to	18	 572	 390	 68	 0	
Revue	française	de	science	politique,	English,	2013/6	(vol.	63)	
	 38	
parliamentary	
left-wing	
(until	2011),	
belonging	to	
the	Alliance	de	la	gauche	démocratique	(Alliance	for	
the	
Democratic	
Left)	
Established	after	the	
unification	of	the	non-
governmental	left,	its	
stems	from	the	Mouvement	national	and	
the	Marxist	movements	of	
the	1970s	
December	2011	Bouznika	
Parti	de	l’avant-garde	démocratique	socialiste	(PADS)	
Born	of	a	split	from	the	
USFP	in	1983	
1993	 6/boycott	 1,100	 7th	congress	30	March	to	1	April	2012,	Rabat,	Harhoura		
584	 231	 39	 N	
Non-
parliamentary	
far	left-wing	
Annahj	addimocrati	
Said	to	follow	in	the	
footsteps	of	Ila	Al	Amam,	a	
Marxist-Leninist	
movement	from	the	1970s	
2004	(1995)	 Boycott	 1,000	 2nd	congress	18	to	20	July	2009	Casablanca	
310	 102	 33	 N	
Non-	
conventional	
political	
organization	
ATTAC-CADTM	
Anti-globalization	
organization	that	is	part	
of	an	international	
network	grouped	together	
around	a	shared	platform.	
Since	2005,	it	has	
experienced	restructuring	
which	has	translated	into	
the	significant	presence	of	
the	Almounadil-a	
(Trotskyists)	in	its	midst.	
2000	 -----	 500	 4th	congress	27	to	29	January	2012	Rabat	
72	 71	 98	 N	
*	0:	Questionnaire	was	inserted	by	congress	organizers	into	the	packets	distributed	to	delegates.			N:	Questionnaire	was	not	inserted.		 	
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Appendix	2.	MCA	Employment-Education	+	Classification	in	6,	axes	1	and	2	
	The	party	to	which	respondents	belonged,	their	education	levels,	the	foreign	languages	they	spoke,	their	sector	of	employment	(public	 administration;	 public	 and	 semi-public	 companies;	 private	 sector;	 permanent	 staff	 of	 political	 parties,	 associations,	trade-unions;	 legislative	 body)	 and	 their	 socio-professional	 category	 are	 active	 variables,	 with	 sizes	 proportional	 to	 their	contribution	to	the	factorial	design.	The	classes	are	projected	with	a	size	proportional	to	their	weight.			
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Appendix	3.	MCA	Allies	and	Adversaries	+	Classification	in	6,	axes	1	and	2	
	All	modalities	are	represented.	The	strategic	positions	are	active	variables,	with	a	size	proportional	to	their	contribution	to	the	factorial	design.	Parties	and	classes	are	projected	with	sizes	proportional	to	their	weight.	[All	=	allies,	Adv	=	adversaries,	nini	=	
neither	ally	nor	adversary,	sr	=	no	answer,	nc	=	not	applicable,	2rep	=	two	responses,	Roi	=	King,	EntRoi	=	King’s	entourage].			
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Appendix	4.	MCA	Allies	and	Adversaries	+	Classification	in	6,	axes	3	and	4	
	All	modalities	are	represented.	The	strategic	positions	are	active	variables,	with	a	size	proportional	to	their	contribution	to	the	factorial	design.	Parties	and	classes	are	projected	with	sizes	proportional	to	their	weight.	[All	=	allies,	Adv	=	adversaries,	nini	=	
neither	ally	nor	adversary,	sr	=	no	answer,	nc	=	not	applicable,	2rep	=	two	responses,	Roi	=	King,	EntRoi	=	King’s	entourage].		
	
